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"THIS CONSTITUTION":
CONSTITUTIONAL INDEXICALS
AS A BASIS FOR TEXTUALIST SEMI-ORIGINALISM
ChristopherR. Green*
Debate over proper methods of constitutionalinterpretation is interminable, in part because the Constitution seems not to tell us how it should be interpreted. I argue here that this appearance is misleading. The Constitution
repeatedly refers to itself with the phrase "this Constitution," and claims to
make itself supreme law of the land. Debates over what should be supreme for
constitutionalinterpretation can be resolved if but only if we have a sufficiently-detailed understanding of what the Constitution is. I consider seven
possibilitiesfor what might be the interpretively-supreme "Constitution": (1) the
originalexpected applications; (2) the originalultimate purposes; (3) the original textually-expressed meaning or Fregeansense (the alternativeIfavor); (4) a
collection of evolving common law concepts; (5) a text expressing meaning by
today's linguistic conventions; (6) a collection of moral concepts refined
through an evolving traditionof moral philosophy; and (7) a collection of nonbinding recommendations. Resolving between these alternatives is possible if
but only if we know that "this Constitution" means.
The phrase "this Constitution" on its own is not perfectly perspicuous; the
"this Union" clause in Article IV shows that "this" can refer to entities that are
neither composed of text norfixed and unchanging. It is not immediately clear
what event-what "constituting"--the word "Constitution" refers to. Canvassing in detail the indexical language of the federal and state Constitutions,
I argue that the Constitution is composed of language whose meaning isfixed
at the time of the Founding. The close textual relationship of "this Constitution" to forms of "here" and to "enumerate" and explicit references in state
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constitutions to "this Constitution" appearingon parchment, including bits of
language, and doing things "expressly" all point toward a Constitution that is
composed of language, and so to textualism. The use of "now," the distinction
in the Preamble between "ourselves" and "ourposterity, "the specification in the
Preamble and Article VII of ratifying conventions as the constitutionalauthor,
and the reference to "the time of the Adoption of this Constitution" all point
toward a non-intergenerationally-authoredconstitution that speaks at the time
of the Founding and is historicallyfixed.
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This Constitution... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby ....I
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution ....2
INTRODUCTION

Academic ferment over originalism in its many varieties has persisted nonstop since Paul Brest invented the term in 1980.3 The
debate "abounds in troublesome arguments-endlessly debated,
perennially plausible, perennially suspect."'4 This Article tackles the
debate by means of a question explored most fully-but not conclusively resolved-by Walter F. Murphy and his coauthors: what is the
1

U.S.

2

Id. art. VI, cl. 3.

CONST.

art. VI, cl. 2.

3 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L.
REv. 204, 204 (1980) ("By 'originalism' I mean the familiar approach to constitutional
adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the
intentions of its adopters.").
4 DAVID LEWIS, Anselm and Actuality, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 10, 10 (1983).
Among the highlights of the past year were Jack M. Balkin's conversion to originalism
and attempt to justify constitutional abortion rights on equal-citizenship originalist
grounds in Abortion and OriginalMeaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion] and Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Redemption]; Mitchell N. Berman's sophisticated and careful attack on originalism in Originalism is Bunk (Working Paper,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078933; and Lawrence B. Solum's massive, philosophically informed defense of a form of originalism in Semantic Originalism
(Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1120244.
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Constitution. 5 Because the Supremacy Clause, quoted above, makes
the Constitution "supreme," a resolution of the "What is the Constitution?" question will tell us, assuming that we agree with Article VI,
what should be supreme in our constitutional interpretation.
This Article is the first attempt to comprehensively assess the Constitution's self-presentation on the basis of the uses of "this Constitution" and other words like "now," "we," and "here"-what
philosophers of language call "indexicals" 6-in state and federal constitutions. This Article greatly elaborates on an approach briefly suggested by Akhil Reed Amar, 7 Vesan Kesavan and Michael Paulsen, 8
5 See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
84-85 (Ist ed. 1986) ("[C]onstitutional interpretation-and thus also public policymust continually grapple with the fundamental question of WHAT the Constitution
includes.... [N]either judges nor commentators have solved the problem of convincingly justifying their answers .... ."); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 29 (1988) ("One must first decide ...what 'the Constitution' is even prior to
deciding what 'it' means. Does 'the Constitution' refer only to the specific text of the
document written in 1787 and amended infrequently thereafter, or does it include as
well a significant unwritten component derived from implicit assumptions of American political traditions?").
6 "Indexicals are linguistic expressions whose reference shifts from context to
context: some paradigm examples are 'I', 'here', 'now', 'today', 'he', 'she', and
'that'." David Braun, Indexicals, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta et al. eds., 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals. The term is
due to David Kaplan, who distinguishes a term's content (a function from possible
circumstances to extensions) from its character(a function from contexts to contents).
See David Kaplan, Demonstratives:An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, andEpistemology of Demonstrativesand Other Indexicals, in THEMES FROM KAPLAN 481, 505 (Joseph
Almog et al. eds., 1989) ("Just as it was convenient to represent contents by functions
from possible circumstances to extensions . . . so it is convenient to represent characters by functions from possible contexts to contents.").
7 See AKHIL REED AMAR,AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 285 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR,
AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION] ("In a closing coda consisting of three short Articles featuring seven self-references to 'this Constitution' (words that had first appeared at the
end of the Preamble), the document proclaimed itself America's 'supreme Law,' superior to all other legal texts .

. . ."

(emphasis added)); id. at 299 ("Whereas the Pream-

ble first introduced the self-referential phrase 'this Constitution,' Article VI echoed
that phrase four times in three short paragraphs, clarifying the precise status of the
document vis-A-vis the old Confederation, the new federal government, and state governments." (emphasis added)); Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism,
Textualism, and Populism, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1657, 1657 (1997) ("In ordinary language we talk about the Constitution, that's what it says here on the cover of my
handy-dandy pocket copy. It is a text with four proverbial corners. It actually uses
words like 'this Constitution' to describe itself as a document." (second emphasis added));
Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REv. 26, 33 (2000)
("With these words [in the Supremacy Clause], the Constitution crowns itself king;
judges and other officials must pledge allegiance to the document." (emphasis added));
id. at 34 ("[T]he document deems itself supreme."); cf.AKHIL REED AMAR,THE BILL
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RIGHTS 296 (1998) (referring to "the precise words that eventually became the
Supreme Law of the Land"). Note that Amar takes for granted that "this Constitution" refers to the document.
8 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127 (2003) ("[T]he Supremacy
Clause ... establishes the text of the document-'this Constitution,' a written document-as that which purports to be authoritative."); id. at 1128 ("The document
itself.. . appears to prescribe textualism (in some form or another) as the proper
mode of interpretation and application of the Constitution by those holding office
under it."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To),
115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2049 (2006) ("[Olur written Constitution directs that it is 'this
Constitution'-a written document-that is supposed to be the supreme Law of the
Land, not anything else."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The IrrepressibleMyth of Marbury,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2741 n.96 (2003) ("[T]he Constitution itself (in Article VI's
specification of '[t]his Constitution' as the supreme law of the land, and the nature of
written constitutionalism generally), requires a methodology of original, objectivepublic-meaning textualism." (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
Kesavan and Paulsen give no support for their view that "this Constitution" refers to
the document; they consider objections to their argument, but none that questions
the meaning they assign to "this" in the Supremacy Clause. See Kesavan & Paulsen,
supra, at 1129 (dismissing other preferred methods of constitutional interpretation).
Paulsen has recently set out his view in more detail. See Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Does the Constitution PrescribeRules for Its Own Interpretation , 103 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301706. He gives a bit more
elaboration to his claim that "this Constitution" refers to the document, putting
emphasis on the term "constitution": "'This Constitution,' means, each time it is
invoked, the written document. It refers to the text of the written Constitution of which
the Enactment Clause, Article VI's Supreme Law Clause and Oath Clause, and Article
VII's Establishment Clause are constitutive, constitutingparts. The document specifies
the document as authoritative." Id. (manuscript at 11). Because it is at least possible to
use the term "constitution" to refer to non-textual practices, however, as in referring
to the British Constitution, or to refer to temporally extended events, see infra Part
II.C, more evidence seems required to establish conclusively that "this" in Article VI is
a textual self-reference.
Paulsen makes two textual arguments in favor of an originalist brand of textualism, but neither of them seems compelling to me. He first argues that because Article
V allows amendments to "this Constitution," we should take meaning as otherwise
fixed: "Article V makes clear that to change the content of the supreme law-to
change whatever 'this Constitution' refers to-involves changing the words of the
text. By implication, the meaning of 'this Constitution' cannot change otherwise."
Paulsen, supra (manuscript at 18). However, this inference does not seem ironclad.
Discovering one moving part to the constitutional machinery does not indicate conclusively that there are no others, any more than it would with a car. The Founders
might have thought that the Article V process of adding text gave the Constitution
certain virtues of adaptability, but the evolution of common law or philosophical concepts supplied others. (In fact, because statutes also count as supreme law under
Article VI, it is not actually true that "to change the content of the supreme law,"
Article V must be used.)
OF
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and Larry Solum, 9 who each contends that the "this Constitution" reference in the Supremacy Clause provides a basis for some form of
constitutional textualism or originalism. I argue that the bare form of
their argument is at best incomplete, because the "this Union" clauses
show that a constitutional "this" can refer to entities that are neither
composed of text nor historically confined to the time of the Founding. However, a closer examination of other instances of the phrase
"this Constitution," both in state constitutions and elsewhere in the
Federal Constitution, makes clear that the phrase is a historically confined textual self-reference. A textualist semi-originalism is the result.
Part I first sets out seven possible entities that could conceivably
serve as an interpretively paramount "Constitution" in keeping with
various positions on interpretation that have been proposed-that is,
seven possible "constitutional ontologies." The first three of these
entities are confined to the time of the Founding. We might take as
interpretively supreme, and hence as "the Constitution," either (1)
the original ultimate constitutional purposes or rationale, (2) the
original set of tangible expected constitutional applications, or (3) the
meaning originally expressed in the constitutional text, which might
diverge from the Founders' purposes and from the applications they
Second, Paulsen points to what he calls the "Done Deal" clause at the conclusion
of the constitutional text: "Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the
States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States
of America the Twelfth." U.S. CONST. art VII; Paulsen, supra (manuscript at 19).
However, as Paulsen himself recognizes a moment later in a footnote, this language
does not conclusively establish September 17, 1787 as the date at which "this Constitution" acts, because the Preamble and Article VII make the time of ratification the time
at which "this Constitution" is "established." See id. (manuscript at 19 n.57); see also
infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the "We the People" language of the Preamble). It all
depends on what, exactly, was "done" on September 17. Paulsen thinks that meaning
was once and for all attached to the constitutional text (and I agree, though I think
more evidence is required). But, based just on the word "done," September 17 might
have been instead, for instance, the start of an intergenerational process of adhering
to a common law or philosophical concept. We need more evidence to exclude that
possibility.
9 Solum, supra note 4 (manuscript at 7) ("The indexical article 'this' in the
phrase 'this Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby' makes a contribution to the meaning of the
clause. The use of 'this' in 'this constitution' points to the semantic content of the
document itself-that is to the Constitution of 1789."); id. (manuscript at 135)
("What does 'this Constitution' refer to? The use of the indexical article 'this' points
the reader to the Constitution of 1789. Because the Supremacy Clause asserts that the
Constitution of 1789 is law, it must be referring to the semantic content of the Constitution."). Solum does not give further explanation for why he reads "this" as pointing
to historically confined semantic content.
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expected the constitutional provisions to produce. Another three possible interpretively paramount candidates for "the Constitution"
might be seen as forms of textualism, but without a historical anchor.
We might take the textual categories either (1) as expressing moral
principles whose precise content can only be understood through a
tradition of moral reflection, (2) as a contemporary coordination
device on the basis of the contemporary meaning of its language, or
(3) as common law concepts, elaborated by judges only over the
course of generations. Or, finally, departing both from a historically
situated and a textual Constitution, we might understand the Constitution as nonbinding, simply offering reasons that can be overridden
by sufficiently important contrary considerations.
After sketching these seven possible constitutional ontologies, I
argue that each of these understandings of the nature of the Constitution could have been made explicit in a supremacy clause. Because of
this contingency in constitutional ontology, reasoning about the function of a written constitution, or the method of interpretation that
would be normatively most attractive, goes astray to the extent that it
departs from whatever constitutional ontology is expressed in our
actual Supremacy Clause. Functional and normative arguments are
only relevant to an understanding of the nature of the actual Constitution to the extent that views about the function of a constitution or
the norms that govern desirable results were, in fact, embodied in our
actual "this Constitution" of Article VI.
Part II turns to the substance of constitutional indexicals as a
basis for proper constitutional ontology rooted in Article VI. I argue
that the bare form of the Amar-Kesavan-Paulsen-Solum argument is
unsuccessful, because the word "this" is not inevitably a historical or
textual self-reference; Article IV refers to "this Union,"10 an entity
which can grow or shrink through the generations and which is not
composed of language. If "this Constitution" in Article VI were our
only guide, it might be possible to consider the Constitution as nontextual or of intergenerational extent in time. However, an examination of the full set of uses of the term "this Constitution" in the Federal Constitution, together with other constitutional indexicals, can
resolve the meaning of "this Constitution" in the Supremacy Clause.
A full survey of this evidence supports an understanding of "this Constitution" as a historical and textual self-reference, and taking the Constitution as binding. Article VI's "shall be bound"' I language indicates
plainly that the Constitution presents itself as a binding obligation,
art. IV, §§ 3-4.

10

U.S.

11

Id. art. VI, c. 2.

CONST.
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not merely as a useful source of guidance or a method of supplying
coordination, and a continuous tradition of American political culture from the Founding to today views officeholders as satisfying Article VI with their oaths, not swearing allegiance to something else. The
Necessary and Proper Clause links "foregoing"' 2 grants of power with
the grants of power elsewhere in "this Constitution," while other
clauses use "enumeration" in reference to "the Constitution,"1 3 and
state constitutions speak of "this Constitution" being engrossed on
parchment, as containing language, and as doing things "expressly,"
14
all of which fit with a textual "this Constitution." The use of "now"'
to refer to the time of the Founding, the careful distinction between
"ourselves" and "our Posterity" in the Preamble, 15 and the way that the
Preamble and Article VII make the ratifying conventions the constitutional author all point toward a historically situated Constitution that
is spoken and receives meaning at the time of the Founding, not
intergenerationally or today.
Part III considers two objections to the suggestion that the Constitution contains sufficient information to tell us what should be interpretively supreme. First I consider the argument that Article VI is
redundant and so cannot embed a constitutional ontology. Even if
Article VI is redundant, it can still give us explicit guidance about what
exactly should be interpretively supreme. Second, I address the frequently suggested complaint of circularity: the claim that the Constitution cannot explain its own nature, or establish criteria for its own
interpretation, simply by its own ipse dixit. I consider several examples
of entities that can explain their own nature without any problem of
circularity. It is true that Article VI's assertion of authority for "this
Constitution" must be accepted in order to be effective, but officeholders today do in fact understand themselves as binding themselves
in the way that Article VI prescribes, frequently invoking Article VI
and claiming to follow it.
I.

THE "WHAT IS THE CONSTITUTION" ISSUE: SEVEN

POSSIBLE ANSWERS

I will frame my discussion about the nature of proper interpretation by discussing the nature of the Constitution itself. Without an
understanding of what the Constitution is, we will inevitably be at a
loss in deciding how to interpret it. On the other hand, establishing
12

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

13

Id. amend. IX.

14

Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.

15

Id. pmbl.
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the nature of the Constitution itself will give us a touchstone for assessing interpretations.
Historical controversies about interpretation were often put in
terms of the nature of the Constitution. For instance, James
Madison's 1824 comments on interpretation begin with his statement
about which sort of entity can legitimately claim to be the Constitution. He wrote to Henry Lee, "Ientirely concur in the propriety of
resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and rati' 16
fied by the nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution."
Frederick Douglass' 1860 Glasgow speech likewise considered the
"What is the Constitution" question as the only proper foundation to a
discussion of constitutional interpretation:
Before we examine into the disposition, tendency, and character of
the Constitution, I think we had better ascertain what the Constitution
itself is.... What, then, is the Constitution? I will tell you.... It is
not even like the British Constitution, which is made up of enactments of Parliament, decisions of Courts, and the established usages
of the Government. The American Constitution is a written instrument full and complete in itself.... It is a great national enactment

done by the people, and can only be altered, amended, or added to
by the people ....... I repeat, the paper itself, and only the paper
17
itself, with its own plainly written purposes, is the Constitution.
Douglass thus founds his view of interpretation on his view that
the Constitution itself consists of the historically fixed, unchanging
text. Justice Patterson likewise remarked on the nature of a constitution in 1795, considering the possible conflict of a Pennsylvania statute with the Pennsylvania Constitution:
What is a Constitution? It is the form of government, delineated by
the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of
fundamental law are established. The Constitution is certain and
fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the
supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the Legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made
it .. ..

The Constitution of a State is stable and permanent, not to be
worked upon by the temper of the times, nor to rise and fall with
the tide of events: notwithstanding the competition of opposing
16 Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 THE WRITINGS
190, 191 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (emphasis added).
17 Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or

OF JAMES MADISON

Anti-Slavery? (Mar. 26, 1860), in 2 THE
467, 468-69 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950).

LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS
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interests, and the violence of contending parties, it remains firm
and immoveable, as a mountain amidst the strife of storms, or a
rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves .... [I]f a legislative act oppugns a constitutional principle, the former must give
way, and be rejected on the force of repugnance .... [I] n such
case, it will be the duty of the Court to adhere to the Constitution,
18
and to declare the act null and void.
On the other hand, Felix Frankfurter ties his evolutionary views
about proper interpretation to a view about the evolutionary nature of
the Constitution: "If the Thames is 'liquid history,' the Constitution of
the United States is most significantly not a document but a stream of
history. And the Supreme Court has directed that stream."1 9 David A.
Strauss likewise frames his view of common law constitutional interpretation as a view about what the Constitution is:
The Constitution of the United States is a document drafted in
1787, together with the amendments that have been adopted from
time to time since then. But in practice the Constitution of the
United States is much more than that, and often much different
from that.... [W]hen people interpret the Constitution, they rely
not just on the text but also on the elaborate body of law that has
developed, mostly through judicial decisions, over the years. In fact,
in the day-to-day practice of constitutional interpretation, in the
courts and in general public discourse, the specific words of the text
play at most a small role, compared to evolving understandings of
what the Constitution requires....

...
[T]he common law approach, not the approach that connects law to an authoritative text, or an authoritative decision by the
Framers or by "we the people," . . .best explains, and best justifies,
20
American constitutional law today.

If, like Article VI, we think that the Constitution is supreme, we
can translate interpretive controversy-that is, controversy over the
proper ultimate interpretive touchstone-into ontological controversy-that is, controversy over what the Constitution is. Textualists
who say that the text should be interpretively paramount, for instance,
implicitly define "the Constitution" as the constitutional text. Those
who advocate a common law method of constitutional interpretation,
in which the subsequent interpretations of judges are as important as
18 Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308-09 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
19

FELIX FRANKFURTER,

THE COMMERCE

CLAUSE UNDER

MARSHALL,

2 (1937).
20 David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation, 63 U.
877, 877, 879 (1996).

TANEY,

AND

WAITE

CHI.

L. REv.
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the text or the history of the adoption of a provision, implicitly define
"the Constitution" as a temporally extended common law concept,
authored though an intergenerational partnership.
In this Part, I will first set out a menu of possible definitions of
"the Constitution" that would fit with various prominent theories of
constitutional interpretation on offer, and then argue that several
methods of deciding between these definitions are inferior to a direct
analysis of "this Constitution" in Article VI. Two preliminary caveats
are in order, however.
First, I aim to give a survey of the most prominent theories of
what should be supreme in constitutional interpretation. Other material may be relevant to constitutional interpretation, however, even if
it is not the supreme touchstone. Those who think the text is paramount, for instance, can still consult the original purpose of a provision as a guide, and vice versa. Put another way, we can distinguish
what interpreters find authoritative from what they find persuasive.
The entity given interpretive supremacy has authority, but other entities will still shed at least reflected light on whatever is interpretively
supreme. 2 1 For instance, elsewhere I explain my theory that the original, textually expressed sense of constitutional language is interpretively supreme, but the original expected applications and later
22
judicial interpretations should still receive some deference.
Second, my focus is constitutional interpretation, not constitutional law as such. Recent thinkers on originalism, most prominently
Keith Whittington, have usefully distinguished constitutional interpre21 My focus on what is interpretively supreme explains my neglect of pluralist
theories like that in PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982), or Stephen M.
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism,2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1185. Bobbitt gives an admirably
clear exposition of six modes of constitutional discourse (text, history, structure, doctrine, prudence, and ethics), but no explanation of how to choose between them. As
a result, he either lacks a theory of interpretive supremacy-and thus lacks anything
that could be a supreme "this Constitution"-or implicitly adopts some sort of common law constitution according to which contemporary interpreters are themselves
supreme in making decisions between the best arguments in the various modes.
Because others more explicitly advocate a common law constitution, I do not consider
pluralism separately.
22 See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 555, 591-92 (2006) ("[A]ssessments of constitutional reference, 'while
not controlling upon [later interpreters of the Constitution] by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which [later
interpreters] may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
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tation from constitutional construction-that is, as Larry Solum
describes it, "activity directed at resolving vagueness, ambiguity, gaps,
and contradictions and at constitutional implicature. '' 23 Much of con-

stitutional law is construction, not interpretation. In attempting only
to consider what should be supreme when we interpret the Constitution, I am not attempting to delimit the proper occasions for constitutional interpretation. For instance, is a court considering a piece of
legislation that may be unconstitutional in a position to make its own
interpretation of the Constitution effective? 24 Are presidents or citizens considering judicial action that may be unconstitutional in a similar position to interpret the Constitution for themselves? 25 What
about courts considering earlier, possibly unconstitutional actions by
the same court?26 Or lower courts deciding cases in the face of possi-

bly unconstitutional action by higher courts, or lower-level executive
officials acting in the face of possibly unconstitutional action by the
President? I answer none of these questions. 2 7 Rather, in considering
what should be supreme in the process of interpretation, I am assuming that the interpreter is, in fact, in a position to interpret the Constitution for herself. Article VI may also be relevant to resolving when
23 Solum, supra note 4 (manuscript at 67); see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 9 (1999) ("The defining features of constitutional constructions are that they resolve textual indeterminacies and that they address
constitutional subject matter."). This book is the companion to KEITH E. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999).

24

Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803) ("[T]he

framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the govern-

ment of courts, as well as of the legislative."), with Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330,
347 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson,J., dissenting) ("The judiciary... cannot take cognizance of a
collision between law and the constitution.").

25 See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:Executive Power
to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
26 See, e.g.,
Gary Lawson, The ConstitutionalCase Against Precedent, 17 HARV.J.L. &
PUB. POL'V 23, 25-28 (1994) (arguing that the President has co-equal power with the
judicial and legislative branches to interpret the Constitution and, moreover, is not
bound by the other branches' interpretation of executive power).
27 Michael Dorf argues (in response to my prompting) that the concern of obedience to unconstitutional judicial action is an argument against constitutional ontology rooted in Article VI. See Posting of Michael Doff to Doff on Law, http://

(June
www.michaeldorf.org/2008/06/and-now-for-something-completely-same.html
13, 2008, 09:35 EST) (Doff comment at 00:16 EST). However, as I explained in a
later comment there, and reiterate in this Article, distinguishing the proper occasions
of constitutional interpretation from the proper method of constitutional interpretation can avoid Dorf's reductio ad departmentalism. See id. (Green comment at 16:02
EST). We can follow Article VI's guidance about what should be interpretively
supreme without settling when we have power to interpret it for ourselves.
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interpreters have the power to make their interpretations effective,
but I leave those questions for another day.
A.

Three Historically Bound Definitions

Turning, then, to the seven views on what should be interpretively supreme, I first briefly set out three views of the Constitution
that confine it to the Founding: the original purposes or reasons for
the Constitution's provisions, the original applications or tangible
expected results of the Constitution, and the original sense expressed
in the Constitution's text (the view I favor).28
1. The Constitution as Original Ultimate Purposes
Justice Breyer has suggested that the Constitution's purposes,
rather than its language or the expectations of its authors, should be
dominant in constitutional interpretation: "My discussion sees individual constitutional provisions as embodying certain basic purposes,
often expressed in highly general terms ....

[A] n understanding of,

and focus upon, those purposes will help ajudge better to understand
and to apply those general purposes [of the whole Constitution] and
to apply specific provisions." 29 Justice Goldberg put a similar position
in terms of the Article VI oath in 1964: "Our sworn duty to construe
the Constitution requires ...

that we read it to effectuate the intent
30

and purposes of the Framers.1 The oath to support the Constitution
is, for Goldberg, an oath to effectuate the Founders' purposes.
Andrew Koppelman argues that purposive analysis is required of any
originalist interpretation of the Constitution. He criticizes Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas for being "indifferent
28 One somewhat tendentious way to think of these three views is that they take
the history of the Constitution at three levels of generality-too high (purposes), too
low (applications), and just right (the level stated in the text).
29 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIvE LIBERTY 115 (2005); see also id. at 115-16 (distinguishing his theory of "reliance upon purposes (particularly abstractly stated purposes)"
from those who "focus primarily upon text, upon the Framers' original expectations,
narrowly conceived, and upon historical tradition"); id. at 8 ("Some judges emphasize
the use of language, history, and tradition. Others emphasize purpose and consequence. These differences of emphasis matter. . . ."); id. at 121 (approving of cases

that interpret the Establishment Clause "to implement the basic value that the Framers wrote the clause to protect"); id. at 124 ("[M]y opinions [in the ten-commandments cases] sought to identify a critical value underlying the Religion Clauses. They
considered how that value applied in modern-day America.").
30 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 288-89 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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He writes

The proper originalist way to undertake this inquiry would be
to look at the ideas of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution
in order to discern why establishment of religion was regarded as a
bad thing, and what principle condemned it. The interpreter
would then try to figure out how that principle applied to the case
being decided.

32

The purpose of a constitutional provision in the eyes of the Framerswhy they adopted a particular provision-is paramount for
33
Koppelman.
A search for the reasons the Founders adopted a particular provision may, of course, produce more than one answer. The ratifiers and
Framers may have disagreed. Or to take Koppelman's example of the
Establishment Clause, different denominations might have opposed a
31 Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1125482.
32 Id.
33 For criticism of an emphasis of making original purposes paramount, rather
than the text, see Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2692 (2008) ("It is not the role
of courts to extrapolate from the words of the Sixth Amendment to the values behind
it, and then to enforce its guarantees only to the extent they serve (in the courts'
views) those underlying values."); Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2392 (2008)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have rejected an approach to individual liberties that
'abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the right."' (quoting
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006))); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006) ("[T]he purpose of the rights set forth in that
Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not follow that the rights can be
disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair."); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's
Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted"Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 19-20 (2006)
("[O]ne very popular [alternative to originalism] can be called the 'underlying principles' approach. We discern from the text the deeper underlying principles that
underlie its particular injunctions. We then appeal to these principles to limit the
scope of the text or ignore it altogether. Those who employ this approach can claim
that they are still enforcing the Constitution, in the sense that they are implementing
the principles for which it stands .... [P]retty much anyone can play this game to
reach virtually any result .... [T]he real arbiters of government power are those in

the courts who discern the underlying principles. Everything then depends on who
the Justices are, rather than on what the Constitution says."). Justice Scalia has said
for the Court that even textually stated purposes cannot trump other parts of the
constitutional text. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008) ("[I]t
may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit
between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.").
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federal establishment for different reasons. Baptists, Congregationalists, and Episcopalians might each have favored a federal establishment, if it were theologically simpatico, but agreed to oppose one out
of fear that it would not be. 34 In general, any provision that represents a compromise between two sides will not have a single purpose.
Consider a contract to sell a car for $2000. What is the purpose of
setting the price at that amount? The seller's purpose, obviously, is to
get as much as possible, but the buyer's purpose is to pay as little as
possible. It would be foolish to say that interpreting the meaning of
"$2000" requires any analysis of the parties' purposes, as opposed to
the meaning of their words.
The Constitution as Collection of Original Applications

2.

Raoul Berger has been the most prominent advocate of the view
that the Constitution requires adherence to the specific applications
expected by the Founders and nothing else. Berger begins with dictum from Charles Sumner: "Every Constitution embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript of their minds. '3 5 Berger then
claims, "A 'transcript of their minds' was left by the framers in the
debates of the 39th Congress." 36 By denouncing as a modification of
the Constitution any change from the way in which the Congress of
1866 would have resolved particular issues, Berger claims that the
"transcript of their minds" in the Congressional Globe itself deserves
37
the deference owed to the Constitution.
There are considerable difficulties in explaining exactly how an
original-applications theory of the Constitution would work. For
example, the 1787 Founders did not have any expectations about the
application of the Constitution to Mississippi.3 8 One semi-answer to
this difficulty would be that the Constitution is not limited to applica34 For a similar story about why the federal Religious Test Clause was supported
by many who supported state-level religious tests, see Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself,
37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 674, 679-713 (1987).

35
GLOBE,

RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY

410 (2d ed. 1997) (quoting CONG.

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866)).

36 Id.
37 Berger's position is distinct from Sumner's point. Sumner said that the Constitution itself was a transcript of the Framers' minds, but Berger says that the transcript
of the Framers' minds-the Congressional Globe-is entitled to the deference due to
the Constitution.
38 Gerard Bradley makes this point. See Gerard V. Bradley, The Bill of Rights and
Originalism, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 417, 418. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in
Heller likewise notes that the First and Fourth Amendments, and so the Second
Amendment, are construed to encompass technological changes:
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tions the Founders actually considered, but also applies to the judgments of constitutionality the Founders would have made, had they
thought about the question. Thus modified, Berger's theory seems to
39
be a WWFD theory-What Would the Founders Do?

Justice Scalia's opinion in the recent cases on the public display
of the Ten Commandments suggests that the Founders' original applications are binding. He relied on the original practices of the Founders to argue that nonsectarian, generically monotheistic public
acknowledgements of God are constitutional. He explained:
It is no answer for JUSTICE

STEVENS

to say that the understand-

ing that these official and quasi-official actions reflect was not
"enshrined in the Constitution's text." The Establishment Clause,
upon which JUSTICE STEVENS would rely, was enshrined in the Constitution's text, and these official actions show what it meant...

What is more probative of the meaning of the Establishment Clause
proposed it, and of the
than the actions of the very Congress that
40
first President charged with observing it?
The Founders' practices "show what [the Constitution] meant,"
apparently conclusively. It might be possible to read Scalia as saying
only that the Founders' practices are entitled to a heavy presumption
in favor of their constitutionality, but not quite a fully binding one.
Scalia would then, however, need to explain exactly when and how
that presumption could be overcome, and why it is not overcome in
41
particular cases.

Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only
those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second
Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the
First Amendment protects modem forms of communications and the
Fourth Amendment applies to modem forms of search, the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,
even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.
Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2791-92 (citations omitted).
39 See, e.g., RicHARD BROOKHISER, WHAT WOULD THE FOUNDERS Do? (2006); Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism,and the New Fuzziness: The Role of
Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 829 n.67 (1990)
("[O]riginalism is essentially an historicist methodology. It asks what the actual historical actors would choose."). Brookhiser's book is, of course, not confined to issues
of constitutional interpretation, and on at least one point related to constitutional law
he shifts his locution to ask "What Did the Founders Mean by Federalism?" BROOKHISER, supra, at 50 (emphasis added).
40 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 896-97 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 724 (2005)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).

41 Likewise, Justices Scalia and Thomas' defense of the constitutionality of the
death penalty in Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), depends on the Founder's

200 9 ]

CONSTITUTIONAL

INDEXICALS

I623

presuppositions about the constitutionality of the death penalty. They each rely heavily on the fact that the Founders enacted death penalties and that the Fifth Amend-

ment presupposes that the government may sometimes take away life. Scalia says:
[T]he very text of the document recognizes that the death penalty is a permissible legislative choice. The Fifth Amendment expressly requires a presentment or indictment of a grand jury to hold a person to answer for 'a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime,' and prohibits deprivation of 'life'
without due process of law. The same Congress that proposed the Eighth
Amendment also .

.

. made several offenses punishable by death.

Id. at 1552 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
Justice Thomas likewise says, "[I]t is clear that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty. That is evident both from the ubiquity of the death penalty in
the founding era and from the Constitution's express provision for capital punishment." Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). It
might be possible to construe Scalia and Thomas as saying that the First Congress'
actions are entitled to a heavy presumption in their favor, and in lieu of some reason
to think otherwise, the Fifth Amendment's presupposition of the constitutionality of
the death penalty should be deemed correct. However, their arguments suggest that
it is not even possible that the Founders could have been mistaken about the constitutionality of the death penalty. That would make sense only if the Constitution were a
collection of original applications to which interpreters are bound. If it were even
theoretically possible for the Founders to be in error about the constitutionality of
particular practices, or for such constitutionality ever to change over time, then Scalia
and Thomas need additional argument to explain why this is not such a possible case.
In fairness to Justice Thomas, he does present a textual argument based on the meaning of the word "cruel." See id. at 1558 (citing dictionary definitions). However, this
argument seems limited to his assessment of particular execution methods, not his
position that the death penalty itself is constitutional. Thomas does not explain the
relationship between his argument from original practices and his argument from the
constitutional text.
Is the argument about the Founders' practices stronger because those practices
are textually presupposed? Put another way, is there a sensible variant of originalism
that puts textually embodied expectations on a plane higher than other original
expectations? It seems not, because factual error could infect textual presuppositions
just as they could infect other expectations of the Founders. For instance, the text of
the Constitution presupposes that North Carolina's population was smaller than
Maryland's, but that factual assumption was wrong. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2
(providing that, until census, Maryland receives six representatives and North Carolina five), with RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL DisTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1793) (showing Maryland has 319,728 inhabitants,
including 103,036 slaves, while North Carolina has 393,751 inhabitants, including
100,572 slaves), and JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 110TH CONGRESS, 2007-2008, at 549 (2007) (showing that in the
Third Congress, the first after the census, Maryland had eight representatives and
North Carolina ten). Given that the text, like the Founders themselves, can make
mistakes about the reference-yielding facts, the mere fact that the death penalty is
presupposed as constitutional textually adds little to the fact that the death penalty
was presupposed as constitutional by the Founders.
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The Constitution as Historically Situated, Sense-Expressing Text

I now turn to the view I favor. Elsewhere, I have explained 42 and
applied 43 a view of the Constitution that aims to be historically bound,
but also textualist. Because I allow some departures from the Founders' expectations about the tangible effect of a provision, I call my
position textualist semi-originalism. It pictures a "zombie" Constitution: part "living" (potentially changing) and part "dead" (fixed).
Textualist semi-originalism views the Constitution as fixed at the time
of the Founding, but only insofar as constitutional meaning is
expressed in the constitutional text, reducible neither to original
expected applications nor to original ultimate purposes.
To distinguish what is conveyed in the text of the Constitution
from the Constitution's expected applications, I draw on a long tradition in the philosophy of language beginning most prominently with
the great logician Gottlob Frege 44 and continuing to such contemporary philosophers as David Kaplan 4 5 and David Chalmers. 46 Frege distinguished an expression's linguistically expressed sense (German
Sinn) from its tangible reference (German Bedeutung)-the object in
the world such language picks out. Frege summarizes the distinction:
"A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses
its sense, refers to or designates its referent. By means of a sign we
express its sense and designate its referent."4 7 Because this view takes
the original Sinn of constitutional language as binding, but not the
original Bedeutung, I call this view the Theory of Original Sinn.
The basic idea behind Frege's distinction is very simple. Building
cars does not change sense of the word "car," because the word "car"
42 See Green, supranote 22, at 559 ("[D]istinctions of long standing in the philosophy of language can present a compelling distinction between which of the Constitution's attributes change and which do not.").
43 See Christopher R. Green, The OriginalSense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: PreEnactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. Crv. RTS. L.J. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Green, PreEnactment History]; Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection
Clause:Subsequent Interpretationand Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTS. L.J. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=110021.
44 See, e.g., Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference, 57 PHIL. REV. 209 (Max Black
trans., 1948) (translating Gottlob Frege, Uber Sinn und Bedeutung, 100 ZEITSCHRiFT FOR
PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK 25 (1892)).
45 See, e.g., David Kaplan, Afterthoughts, in THEMES FROM KAPLAN 565 (Joseph
Almog et al. eds., 1989); Kaplan, supra note 6.
46 See, e.g., DavidJ. Chalmers, On Sense and Intension, 16 PHIL. PERSP. 135 (2002).
47 Frege, supranote 44, at 214. The word "meaning" seems usually to convey the
idea of sense, but it can also convey the idea of reference. If we speak, for instance, of
the "tangible meaning" of an expression, we are speaking of the particular objects in
the world that an expression designates.
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expresses the same thing even though more and more cars exist.

Building cars does, however, change the reference of the word "car,"
because it creates more objects in the world covered by the word
"car." If, then, we were bound by a constitutional provision that
required us to do something with "cars" (say, to destroy all the fuelinefficient ones) we would have to find out the facts of the worldthat is, find all the cars in the world-in order to determine the tangible effect of that provision. Knowing the sense conveyed by the term
"car" is not enough to know constitutional outcomes; we must also
know the facts about the world. If, then, we are merely bound by the
sense expressed in the constitutional text, the facts about the world
offer a way in which our assessments of constitutional outcomes can
properly differ from the Founders' assessments.
Those like Berger who are concerned exclusively with the Founders' tangible expectations about the effect of a constitutional provision, then, are thus concerned with the reference of constitutional
language. Berger himself, when confronted with the sense-reference
distinction by Hugo Adam Bedau, replied by claiming that "the Founders clearly tied 'meaning' to 'reference. ' '

48

Berger thereby very

helpfully situated his own theory with respect to a theory like mine
that would put primacy on the constitutional text. What matters for
Berger is not what the constitutional text says, but the specific applications the Founders understood it to have-Fregean reference.
Frege was neither the first nor the last to draw this distinction.
Earlier, John Stuart Mill had distinguished "connotation" (essentially
Fregean sense) from "denotation" (Fregean reference) .49 Later philosophers of language building on Frege's basic view have similarly
distinguished "intension" (a technical term with an "s") from "extension." A word's extension is its reference-the tangible object the
48 Raoul Berger, Death Penalties and Hugo Bedau: A CrusadingPhilosopherGoes Overboard, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 863, 872-73 (1984) (replying to the invocation of Frege in
Hugo Adam Bedau, Berger's Defense of the Death Penalty: How Not to Read the Constitution,
81 MICH. L. REv. 1152, 1161-62 (1983)).
49 1 JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 30-40 (J.M. Robson ed., Univ. of
Toronto Press 1973) (1843). Some have found something like the sense-reference
distinction in Plato, see George Rudebusch, Plato on Sense and Reference, 94 MIND 526,
526 (1985) ("It seems to me undisputable that Plato did understand the general form
of Frege's solution and, understanding it, rejected it."), Aristotle, see Keith Allan, Aristotle's Footprints in the Linguist's Garden, 26 LANGUAGE Sci. 317, 329-30 (2004) ("Aristotle distinguishes sense from reference two millennia before Frege (1892) refined
the distinction."), and many others, see RICHARD L. MENDELSOHN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
GOTrLOB FREGE, at xv (2005) (listing the Stoics, William of Ockham, and Arnauld, as
well as Mill).
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word picks out in the world. 50 An expression's intension, determined
by its sense, is a function from possibilities to extensions: that is, a
relation that associates possible worlds as input with tangible objects as
output.5 I Just as we must know the facts about the world in order to
know the reference of constitutional language, we must know the facts
about the world in order to know which possible world to plug into
our constitutional intension and thereby produce our constitutional
extension.
The textualist semi-originalism of the Theory of Original Sinn is
founded on the possibility that the Founders could be wrong or ignorant about the constitutional outcomes today because the Founders
could be wrong or ignorant about the facts that characterize our
world. We must interrogate Founders' assessments of the tangible
effect of their provisions to see if those assessments depend on errors
52
about the reference-yielding facts, or on facts that have changed.
Dred Scott 53 notwithstanding, the Framers were not "incapable of

asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting." 54 The Founders were eminently fallible and capable of misunderstanding the facts on which the application of a constitutional
provision would depend. If only the historic, textually expressed
sense is interpretively binding, and not the Founders' specific applications, we must attempt to work backward from the Framers' applications to discern the facts in virtue of which the constitutional language

50 See Chalmers, supra note 46, at 135.
51 See id. at 145 ("[A]n expression's sense might be seen as an intension: a function from possibilities to extensions. This function takes a given possibility, and associates it with an extension relative to that possibility."); Jerrold J. Katz, The Problem in
Twentieth-Century Philosophy, 95 J. PHIL. 547, 553 (1998) ("Frege defined sense as the
determiner of reference, and the subsequent Carnapian doctrine on which sense is a
function from possible worlds to extensions is only a slight modification that brings
Frege's definition in line with the modal expansion of the universe."); William G.
Lycan, What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental, 4 PHIL. PERSP. 109, 113 (1990) ("Each
concept or Fregean intension can be represented in the standard way as a function
from possible worlds to extensions.").
52 For an instance of such an interrogation ofJames Wilson's 1866 view that even
the broad language of an early version of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would not
require school desegregation, see Green, supra note 22, at 606-08 (showing how Wilson's position was based on his view of which privileges were actually afforded to all
citizens, and arguing that we are entitled to disagree with Wilson on that factual
question).
53 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
54 Id. at 410.
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had those applications. 55 Only then can we can find the intensional
function from possibilities to outcomes which, when applied to the
facts as the Framers saw them, produces the applications as the Framers saw them. The Founders' textually expressed intensional function
is interpretively binding, but not necessarily the applications it
produces.
The sense-reference distinction and its kin are closely related to
the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Analytic
judgments are true or false solely in terms of the meaning (the
Fregean sense) of its terms-they are true "by definition." 56 The standard example is "all bachelors are unmarried," which is true just
because of what "bachelors" and "unmarried" mean. Synthetic judg57
ments, however, are true or false partly in virtue of how the world is.
One example is "there are fifteen bachelors in this room," whose truth
depends on the state of this room, notjust the word "bachelors." If we
are bound, then, by the sense that the Founders used the constitutional language to express, we are bound by their analytic constitutional judgments-that is, the definitions they would supply to the
language they enacted-but we are not bound by the Founders' synthetic constitutional judgments-that is, judgments about constitu58
tionality that depend in part on the facts about the world.
The Supreme Court's 1926 explanation of the consistency of
changing constitutional applications with unchanging constitutional
meaning hits a note very similar to the Theory of Original Sinn:
[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the

scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new
and different conditions which are constantly coming within the
field of their operation. In a changing world it is impossible that it
should be otherwise .... [A] degree of elasticity is thus imparted,
not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional
principles ....59

The High Court of Australia explained in 1959, using Mill's terms:
55 Cf MoRRS R. COHEN & ERNEsT NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LoGic 31 (1962)
("Why a term is applied to a set of objects is indicated by its intension; the set of
objects to which it is applicable constitutes its extension.").
56 Georges Rey, The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 6, at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/.
57 Id.
58 Quine's attacks on the analytic-synthetic distinction are therefore an attack on
the Fregean tradition. For a response, see generally H.P. Grice & P.F. Strawson, In
Defense of a Dogma, 65 PHIL. REv. 141 (1956) (responding to Professor Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction).
59 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
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We must not, in interpreting the Constitution, restrict the denotation of its terms to the things they denoted in 1900. The denotation
of words becomes enlarged as new things falling within their connotations come into existence or become known. But in the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or connotations of its
words should remain constant. We are not to give words a meaning
different from any meaning which they could have borne in 1900.
Law is to be accommodated to changing facts. It is not to be
60
changed as language changes.
B.

Other Distinctions:Intent v. Understandingv. Meaning, Objective v.
Subjective, and Ratifiers v. Framers

Before considering other ways to define "the Constitution," some
reflection on the three theories of a Constitution confined to the time
of the Founding will be helpful. The trichotomy marked above
among historically rooted theories of the Constitution-that between
original ultimate purposes, original application, and original textually
expressed sense-seems more felicitous than the distinction between
"original intent," "original understanding," and "original meaning."6 1
Any of my three historically confined constitutional ontologies could
be put in terms of intent, understanding, or meaning. We can speak
of the ultimate purpose the Founders originally intended to pursue,
or the sense originally intended to be expressed by the text, or the
originally intended applications. We can likewise speak of originally
understood ultimate purposes, or of originally understood applications, or of the sense originally understood to be expressed by the
text. Finally, we can speak of the Constitution's ultimate meaning (its
ultimate goal and purpose), its tangible, concrete meaning (its application), or its textually expressed meaning (its Fregean sense) .62
60 See Ex parte Prof'l Eng'rs' Ass'n (1959) 107 C.L.R. 208, 267.
61 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143-60 (1990) (explaining
Bork's theory in a chapter entitled "The Original Understanding"); Edwin Meese III,
Toward ajurisprudenceof OriginalIntent, 11 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'v5, 6 (1988) (providing an argument for original intent, a view which understands the Constitution "as a
document of fixed meaning, supplied by those who framed and ratified it"); Antonin
Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General's Conference on Economic Liberties in
Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE app. C, at 6
(Office of Legal Pol'y, U.S. Dep't ofJustice ed., 1987) ("In the interests of precision
...I suppose I ought to campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of Original
Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning.").
62 The last of these three, Fregean sense, is perhaps what is most naturally conveyed by "meaning," though Berger's statement that "the Founders clearly tied 'meaning' to 'reference,'" supra note 48, shows he would disagree. See also Mark D.
Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 582

2009]

CONSTITUTIONAL

INDEXICALS

1629

The distinction between intent and understanding has been associated with the distinction between the Framers and ratifiers. 63 However, because the drafters had understandings, and the ratifiers had
intentions, the intention-understanding distinction cuts across the
Framer-ratifier distinction. All four possibilities are live-Framers'
intentions, Framers' understandings, ratifiers' intentions, and
ratifiers' understandings.
The distinction between ratifiers and Framers is only critical if we
take either an original purposes or original applications approach. It
is possible that the Framers and ratifiers had significantly different
purposes, or had different applications in mind. However, the Framers and the ratifiers did have the same text. Barring linguistic evolution from 1787 to 1788 (or, for the Fourteenth Amendment, from
1866 to 186764 or 1868), then, the historic, textually expressed sense
should be the same between the two groups.
I find similarly obscure the connection between the intent-understanding distinction and the distinction between what was objective
and public and what was subjective and private. 65 Intentions can be
objective and publicly manifested (if, for instance, they are stated in
the Congressional Globe or the Federalist Papers), while understandings
can be subjective and private (if, for instance, they are stated only in a
(1998) (pointing out "a distinction between two uses of the term 'meaning'"); id. at
588-89 (relying briefly on Frege's sense-reference distinction to describe the different
uses of "meaning").
63

See, e.g.,Balkin, Redemption, supra note 4, at 445 ("'[O]riginal intention'

seemed to focus on the intentions of the persons who drafted the document, but
surely it was the ratifiers' views that counted because only they had the authority to
make the proposed Constitution law. 'Original understanding' better captured a
focus on the authorizing audience for the text as opposed to the text's drafters.");
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 8, at 1137 ("The shift to original understanding was
part of an increased recognition that it was the action of the Constitution's Ratifersstate ratifying conventions in the case of the original document and state legislatures
in the case of the amendments-whose actions gave legal life to the otherwise dead
words on paper drafted by the Philadelphia Convention and the Congresses proposing the amendments.").
64 That is,
the time at which the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by threefourths of the northern denominator, if that was all that was required. See AMAR,
AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 364-80 (suggesting that only the votes of
the northern states were necessary to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment).
Kesavan & Paulsen, supranote 8, at 1138 ("The shift in emphasis from
65 See, e.g.,
original intent to original understanding was also, in part, a shift away from the subjectivity and imprecision inherent in investigations of legislative history and toward a
more objective test of constitutional meaning. Under 'original understanding,'
nobody's subjective intention is controlling; only the Ratifiers' (reasonable Ratifier's?)
(objective?) understanding of what the document meant or of what the Framers
intended is controlling.").
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diary, or are never stated at all). These distinctions, then, are also
cross-cutting; we can have public intentions, public understandings,
private intentions, and private understandings.
Fregean senses, however, are inherently sharable between more
than one user of a language. Frege distinguished a term's "sense"
from its subjective "conception," the idea or mental image a particular
user associated with it: "The referent of a proper name is the object
itself which we designate by its means; the conception, which we
thereby have, is wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, which is
no longer subjective like the conception, but is yet not the object
itself."' 66 Frege compares a term's referent to the moon, a term's
sense to a single telescope used by more than one viewer to see the
moon, and a term's conception to the individual retinal images produced by the light coming from the telescope. 67 The sense, like a
telescope, "can be used by several observers." 68
C.

Three NonhistoricalForms of Textualism

Turning away from approaches to interpretation that find the
Constitution to be historically confined to the Founding, the most
prominent theories tend to give at least some heed to the constitutional text. Many interpreters depart from either a historically situated or textually expressed Constitution, but relatively few attempt to
do both.
There are at least three ways that various interpreters have proposed staying faithful to the text of the Constitution, but without
adhering to its historic meaning. One is to view the text as expressing
moral language, to be elucidated through the process of moral philosophy. A second is to view the text as if it were spoken today, expressing contemporary meaning. A third is to view the text as expressing
common law concepts, to be updated through the process of
adjudication.
In considering textualist definitions of the Constitution, we do
well to remember that to be bound to the text of the Constitution is to
be bound in some manner to the meaning expressed in that text.
Article VI's command that judges are to be "bound" by "this Constitution" is not satisfied if judges put the physical text of the Constitution
in a box and tie it to their foreheads or arms, d la Deuteronomy 6:8
66

Frege, supra note 44, at 213.

67

Id.

68

Id.
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and the use of phylacteries. 69 To be bound to the constitutional language is obviously in some way to be bound to obey the content-the
meaning-expressed by that language. However, the meaning of the
text might not be the original meaning of the text, if we regard the
text as the product of an intergenerational process, or as a new product today. In those cases, the meaning is the meaning of the author,
but the author is either temporally extended or exists today.
The dispute between forms of textualism thus concerns the manner in which meaning is attached to the text. The Theory of Original
Sinn views that process as historical and confined to the Founding:
meaning is attached to the text when it is enacted, and is binding and
unchanging. The versions of textualism discussed here see meaning
as attached to the text either (1) through an extended process of philosophizing about the best conception for the textually expressed concept, (2) through the application of linguistic standards that exist at
the time of interpretation, or (3) through an extended process of
common law reasoning. Put another way, the dispute among forms of
textualism concerns how to understand what sort of "constituting" the
Constitution is. As textual theories, they agree that such constituting
is textual. The difference concerns whether that constituting happens
only at the Founding, or whether that constituting happens today, or
through a temporally more extended philosophical or adjudicative
process.
1. The Constitution as Set of Moral Principles
Ronald Dworkin has most prominently promoted the "moral
reading" of the Constitution:
The difficult clauses of the Bill of Rights, like the due process and
equal protection clauses, must be understood as appealing to moral
concepts rather than laying down particular conceptions; therefore
a court that undertakes the burden of applying these clauses fully as
law must be an activist court, in the sense that it must be prepared
70
to frame and answer questions of political morality.
Dworkin explains, "According to the moral reading, these clauses
[like the First and Fourteenth Amendments] must be understood in
the way that their language most naturally suggests: they refer to
69 See Deuteronomy 6:6, 6:8 (English Standard Version) ("And these words that I
command you today shall be on your heart.... You shall bind them as a sign on your
hand, and they shall be as frontlets between your eyes."). Neither would the command to "support" the Constitution be satisfied by holding a copy of the text in one's
hands.
70 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147 (1977).
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abstract moral principles and incorporate these by reference, as limits
on government's power."'7 1 "The moral reading proposes that we
all-judges, lawyers, citizens-interpret and apply these abstract
clauses on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about
72
political decency and justice.
Dworkin builds his theory of concepts and conceptions on W.B.
Gallie's 1956 essay Essentially Contested Concepts, which introduced that
distinction. 73 Gallie defined essentially contested concepts as those
that "inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses on
the part of their users. ' 74 He gave seven criteria for identifying them,
two of which point to a temporally extended process for their delineation. 75 Gallie's "openness" criterion is that the embodiment of a concept "must be of a kind that admits of considerable modification in
the light of changing circumstances; and such modification cannot be
prescribed or predicted in advance. ' 76 Gallie's "progressive competition" criterion concerns "continuous competition . . . between the

77
contestant users of the concept."
Dworkin claims that his theory is textualist, but in no way
originalist:
If courts try to be faithful to the text of the Constitution, they will
for that very reason be forced to decide between competing concep-

tions of political morality.... [T]he [philosophy of the] conservative critics of the Warren Court . . . ignores the direction to face
78
issues of moral principle that the logic of the text demands.

However, his belief that the language of the constitution
expresses moral concepts is not rooted in a historical belief about how
the Founders used constitutional language; he thus maintains his
"long-standing opposition to any form of originalism. ''79 Just as moral
71 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM's LAW 7 (1996).
72 Id. at 2.
73 See DWORKIN, supra note 70, at 103 (relying on W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested
Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 167 (1956), for the distinction between concepts and conceptions).
74 Gallie, supra note 73, at 169.
75 Id. at 171-72, 180.
76 Id. at 172.
77 Id. at 180.

78

DWORKIN,

supra note 70, at 136.

79 Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 FoRPDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1258 n.18 (1997). Dworkin made this clarification to
rebut the impression that the sketch of "semantic originalism" he had made in
response to Scalia was Dworkin's own view. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MAT
TER OF INTERPRETATION 115, 119 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (distinguishing "'semantic' originalism, which insists that the rights-granting clauses be read to say what those
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philosophy is an intergenerational project, Dworkin says that each
generation must decide for itself what conception of the constitutional concept is the right one. In a sense, he says, "[t]he broad
clauses of the Constitution 'delegate' power to the Court to enforce its
own conceptions of political morality," though he hastens to add that
the Court must 'Justify its conception by arguments showing the connection between its conception and standard cases," adding, "[i]f the
Court finds that the death penalty is cruel, it must do so on the basis
of some principles or groups of principles that unite the death penalty
with the thumbscrew and the rack."80 "The Constitution insists that
our judges do their best collectively to construct, reinspect, and revise,
generation by generation, the skeleton of freedom and equality of
concern that its great clauses, in their majestic abstraction, command." 8 1 The work of finding the proper conception of the constitutional concepts requires from succeeding generations "a fusion of
constitutional law and moral theory" to produce tangible results, and
82
such work is thus, like moral philosophy, never finished conclusively.
Dworkin's theory has, of course, been quite influential, at least
among theorists. Sotirios Barber and James Fleming offer one recent
Dworkinian account that frames itself as a view about what the Constitution is. "The what question... [that is,] whether the Constitution is
who made them intended them to say, and 'expectation' originalism, which holds
that these clauses should be understood to have the consequences that those who
made them expected them to have").
80 DwoRKJN, supra note 70, at 136 n.1.
81 RONALD DWORK1N, LIFE'S DOMINION 145 (1993).
82 DwoRIUN, supra note 70, at 149. Dworkin's "long-standing opposition to any
form of originalism" is worth keeping in mind in distinguishing his view from the view
that the language of some constitutional provisions may, in their historical context,
express moral concepts and refer to moral reality. Dworkin's view of the text of the
Constitution does not depend on a historical analysis of that language, but simply on
how that language reads to him on its face. On the textualist semi-originalism of the
Theory of Original Sinn, if there were reason to think that, in its historical context,
the language of the Constitution expressed moral properties, then interpreters would
be required to assess the moral facts in order to know the referent of constitutional
language. However, I have argued that one of the most popular such examples-the
requirement in the Equal Protection Clause that a state not "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1-actually refers to the equal provision of the remedial and enforcement functions
of government, to which the phrase "protection of the laws" expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment's historical context, and not to a generic requirement of fairness
or equal concern and respect, as Dworkin would have it. Compare Green, Pre-Enactment History, supra note 43, at 5-9 (arguing that the text of the Equal Protection
Clause points to government functions), with DwoRMN, supra note 71, at 7-12 (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause is composed of moral concepts).
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a code of detailed historical conceptions or a charter of abstract moral
concepts is central to the question of how to interpret the Constitution."8 3 "What justifies Dworkin's call for . . . a fusion [of constitu-

tional law and moral philosophy] is the Constitution's own
requirement that its interpreters think self-critically for themselves
about the meaning of controversial constitutional provisions embodying general concepts. '84 Whether Dworkin, Barber, and Fleming are
right depends, of course, on whether the text does in fact require
such an intergenerational partnership.
2.

The Constitution as Historically Unanchored, Contemporary
Meaning-Expressing Text

Some theorists resist viewing the constitutional text as authored
by the Founders, and instead consider the Constitution's present-day
functions as critical in the process of assigning meaning to it.85 The

Constitution on such a view is not a constituting at the time of the
Founding, but an act today of leaving those words in place, allowing
them to constitute our frame of government. Accordingly, Alexander
Meiklejohn views the Constitution as deriving its meaning from its
acceptance today, not from its acceptance by the Founders:
[The Constitution] derives whatever validity, whatever meaning, it
has, not from its acceptance by our forefathers one hundred and
sixty years ago, but from its acceptance by us, now.... What do We,
the People of the United States, mean when we8 provide
for the free6
dom of belief and of the expression of belief?
Likewise, David Strauss, while his theory also has common law
traditionalism as another component, embraces results that contradict
the historical meaning of constitutional language, as long as those
results fit with how that language might be used today. For example,
Strauss believes that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right
"to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense"8 7would not, at the

time of the Founding, have expressed the right to a governmentally
83 SOTIRIos A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, at
xvi (2007).
84 Id. at 30.
85 One commenter has complained that my earlier work fails to rebut the idea
that the Constitution is a set of "self-given instructions to ourselves for the present."
See Books Do Furnish a Room, http://booksdofurnisharoom.blogspot.com/2007/
07/philosophy-of-language-and-originalism.html (July 19, 2007, 16:27 EST) (comment at 01:59 EST) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 3-4 (1965).

87 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
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funded lawyer, but only the right to hire one's own lawyer. 88 However, Strauss thinks that the contrary result in Gideon v. Wainwright8 g
can be justified because it fits with the text as it could be read today,
even though this fit "is just a coincidence-almost a matter of homonymy."90 Strauss reasons that such exploitation of homonymy is justified because the text is relevant not as a historically situated entity, but
only as a coordination-enabling convention device today. "So long as
a judge can show that her interpretation of the Constitution can be
reconciled with some plausible ordinary meaning of the text ... she
has maintained some common ground with her fellow citizens who
might disagree vehemently about the morality or prudence of her
decision." 9 1
The Constitution as Collection of Common Law Concepts

3.

Finally among forms of textualist Constitution unconfined to the
Founding period is the common law Constitution. David Strauss and
Felix Frankfurter's statements of such a constitutional ontology were
quoted above. 9 2 The theorist who has probably explicated a common
law Constitution most recently and in the greatest detail is Jed
Rubenfeld. 93 He holds that the function of the constitutional text is
to identify particular historic paradigm cases. Judges are then free to
enunciate principles that will cover the paradigm cases and others as
well:
The Constitution's core applications serve as paradigm cases. They

provide the reference points for the construction of doctrinal
frameworks.
Judges build interpretive frameworks or paradigms around the
Constitution's paradigmatic Application Understandings. In this
88

See Strauss, supranote 20, at 919-20 (citing WILLIAM M. BEANEv, THE RIGHT TO
8-33 (1955)). The Supreme Court has recognized this

COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS

original, narrow view of the Sixth Amendment. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640,
660-66 (1948).
89 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
90 Strauss, supra note 20, at 920.
91 Id.
92 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
93 SeeJED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME (2001);JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY
JUDICIARY (2005) [hereinafter RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION]; Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and
Time, 1998 ACTAJURIDICA 291; Jed Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation,in CONSTITuTIONALISM 194 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Legitimacy];Jed
Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE LJ. 1119 (1995) [hereinafter
Rubenfeld, Reading];Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1085 (1998).
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process they regard themselves as free to break from No-Application
Understandings....
Reasoning from paradigm cases is a variegated business-incorporating considerations of text, policy, and justice; requiring ineluctably normative, even ideological judgment-but it is the primary
business of constitutional interpretation....
In the course of paradigm case reasoning, judges periodically
tear down the interpretive paradigms they have constructed, replacing them with new ones ..
...[N]ew doctrine labors under the continuing obligation to
do justice to the paradigm cases-or, more precisely, to do justice to
94
the text in light of its paradigm cases.
Rubenfeld sees the activity of judges elaborating doctrine over
time as part of the essentially intergenerational aspect of self-government. It is only over the course of generations, not in the moment of
a particular Founding, that a self-governing constitutional commitment can ever genuinely be made. Rubenfeld reads the Preamble as
supporting his understanding: "If self-government is a generationspanning project, there must be a generation-spanning subject of this
project. This subject I call a people.... [T] he idea of an intergenerational 'people' is well known to American constitutional thought. The
Constitution seems to claim such a people as its author."95 I will consider below whether such an approach properly construes the
Preamble.
D.

The Constitution as Nonbinding

Paul Brest's famous article describes an approach to the Constitution that he calls "adjudication," suggesting that the Supreme Court
abandon its "felt need to justify decisions by invoking the authority of
the Constitution. '9 6 The text and original understanding, he says, are
non-binding:
94 RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 93, at 15-16, 17. The emphasis on paradigm cases is also a characteristic of Dworkin's approach. Recall his statement quoted
earlier in the text accompanying note 80 that judges interpreting the Eighth Amendment must analogize punishments to the "thumbscrew and rack." Gallie's theory of
concepts and conceptions also contends that essentially contested concepts are
anchored by an "original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users." Gallie, supra note 73, at 180.
95 Rubenfeld, Reading, supra note 93, at 1146 (citing U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
96 Brest, supra note 3, at 235.
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The only difference between moderate originalism and
nonoriginalist adjudication is one of attitude toward the text and
original understanding. For the moderate originalist, these sources
are conclusive when they speak clearly. For the nonoriginalist, they
are important but not determinative. Like an established line of
precedent at common law, they create a strong presumption, but
97
one which is defeasible in light of changing public values.
Better, he says, to "treat the text and original understanding as
persuasive but not authoritative." 9 8 Likewise, Walter Murphy is drawn
to metaphors quite unlike those in Article VI's command that officials
be "bound" by "this Constitution." He says, "The Framers were
shrewd people and they understood many of the pitfalls of politics
which endanger men of all ages; but their wisdom, to remain wisdom,
can impose guidance, not chains."99
The Contingency of Constitutional Ontology

E.

Summarizing the material above, we can organize our seven possible constitutional ontologies according to whether they are textualist, historically bound, or both:

Non

1

Confined to Founding
Original Ultimate Purposes

I

Non-Fixed

Textualist

Original Applications

Non-Binding
Construction

Text uaist

Originally Textually-Expressed Sense

Common-Law Concepts

Moral Principles

Contemporary Meaning

To decide which of these seven ontologies is the correct one, we
should first clarify whether we are seeking to answer a general question about the nature of any constitution, or whether we are seeking
merely to assess the nature of our Constitution. If the former question
had a single answer, then we could know the nature of our constitution merely from general considerations, and no one would need to
consider particular details about the construction of our own particular Constitution. However, particular details plainly are relevant to
constitutional ontology. Because the Constitution could have embedded any of these seven ontologies explicitly, general reasoning cannot
be conclusive on the nature of any particular constitution.
97 Id. at 229.
98 Id. at 235.
99 Walter F. Murphy, The Constitution: Interpretation and Intent, 45 A.B.A. J. 592,
595 (1959).
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Consider, then, seven ways that the Constitution could have
embedded any of our seven constitutional ontologies explicitly:
1. The ultimate purposes of the drafters and ratifiers of this Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land, and all legislative, executive and judicial officers shall be bound by oath or affirmation to
support them, any thing in the expected applications or text of this
Constitution notwithstanding.
2. The applications of this Constitution expected by the drafters and
ratifiers of this Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land,
and all legislative, executive and judicial officers shall be bound by
oath or affirmation to support them, resolving specific controversies
in the way in which those drafters and ratifiers would have resolved
them.
3. The meaning expressed by the text of this Constitution at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution shall be the supreme law
of the land, and all legislative, executive and judicial officers shall
be bound by oath or affirmation to support that meaning, notwithstanding any contrary expectations of the drafters or ratifiers, to the
extent that those contrary expectations depend on their incorrect
factual assessments.
4. The moral principles expressed in the text of this Constitution, as
elaborated by the methods of moral philosophy by the founding
and successive generations, shall be the supreme law of the land,
and all legislative, executive and judicial officers shall be bound by
oath or affirmation to support them, interpreting those principles
in light of their history to make the Constitution the best it can be.
5. The meaning of the text of this Constitution, as expressed by the
text at the time officers fulfill their offices, shall be the supreme law
of the land, and all legislative, executive and judicial officers shall
be bound by oath or affirmation to support it.
6. The concepts in the text of this Constitution, as elaborated by the
methods of the common law by the founding and successive generations, shall be the supreme law of the land, and all legislative, executive and judicial officers shall be bound by oath or affirmation to
support them.
7. This Constitution shall not be binding on legislative, executive
andjudicial officers, but such officers shall retain the right to depart
from its requirements in light of sufficiently important countervailing considerations.
Imagine further that officials actually swore oaths in keeping with
these variants on Article VI. If that were the case-that is, if officials'
oaths explicitly adopted a theory of the nature of the Constitutionthen it would be obvious what theory of the nature of the Constitution
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was the right one. We would not have discretion to decide for ourselves what sort of Constitution or interpretive method might seem
best to us. 0 0
Our constitutional ontology, then, is contingent-it depends on
the particularway in which Article VI is written. There is nothing necessary about a written constitution that literally requires constitution
makers to write their supremacy clause in one of these ways or
another. We might, of course, have reasons to believe that some of
these possible supremacy clauses would be very foolish clauses to
write. Added to the empirical proposition that the Founders were not
fools, we might then have reason to think that the Founders did not,
in fact, adopt such a supremacy clause. However, there is nothing
necessary about adopting a non-foolish supremacy clause.
Because the nature of our Constitution is contingent and would
plainly be determined by Article VI if it were explicit, we must devote
attention to our actual Article VI to see if it contains an implicit constitutional ontology. To decide the nature of the actual Constitution,
there is no substitute for figuring out what "this Constitution" means
in the actual Article VI, and deciding which of these seven possibilities-or some other possibility-best captures that meaning. 10 1
I hope to explain in more detail in a later work why a constitutional theory rooted in "this Constitution" is superior to other possible
foundations. Others seek to understand the nature of the Constitution by seeing it as desirable 0 2 or legitimate,1 0 3 or by reducing inter100 This conclusion will, of course, itself not seem obvious to many. Below in Part
III.B, I consider the most frequent objection to the constitutionally specified constitutional ontology: that such a self-definition would be viciously circular.
101 Of course, we might decide after looking at the evidence that we really can't
tell what "this Constitution" means in Article VI. In that case, however, we would
simply not know the nature of the Constitution; such ignorance would not give us
license to decide on our own what sort of Constitution we would like best.
102 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CA.. L.
Rv. 535, 548 (1999) ("[O]riginalists, like all other participants in constitutional theoretical debates, carry a burden of normative justification. They must attempt to establish that the constitutional regime would be a better one-as measured by relevant
criteria-if constitutional practice were exclusively text-based and if originalist
precepts were consistently followed."); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A
PragmaticDefense of Originalism,101 Nw. U. L. REv. 383, 384 (2007) ("Provisions created through the strict procedures of constitutional lawmaking are likely to have good
consequences. Sustaining these good consequences, however, depends on adhering
to the Constitution's meaning when it was ratified.").
103 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNEr, RESTORING THE LoST CONSTITUTION 107 (2004)
("Overriding writtenness to reach results that some deem superior places the rights of
everyone at peril. Oiginalism as a method of interpretation is crucial to the structural protection provided by writtenness."); id. at 109 ("[C]onsiderations of legitimacy
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pretation to a search for the author's intent, 10 4 or by understanding
the general nature of law.' 0 5 But the contingency of constitutional
ontology helps show why such approaches fall short. Whether our
Constitution is desirable or legitimate is itself contingent; our best
assessment of which ontology represents the actual Constitution and
which one is most normatively attractive can come apart. 10 6 Likewise,
justify originalism as well (as practical considerations]. Constitutional legitimacy
requires assurance that only proper laws are enacted, applied, and enforced. A written constitution is a crucial structural feature that helps provide such assurance. This
assurance would not be forthcoming, however, if the political actors who must respect
these limits, including judges, are free to disregard them. In short, it contributes to
constitutional legitimacy for the original meaning of written limits on the power of
lawmakers to remain the same until they are properly amended."); EthanJ. Leib, The
Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 359 (2007)
("Originalists either bracket the problem of the document's legitimacy, evade the
basic question of the document's legitimacy, or are content that they have come up
with some account that takes this question off the table. Living constitutionalists just
can't get over it; the anxiety about legitimacy is always present and pervasive ...
Living constitutionalists are plagued by anxiety about the dead hand of the past-and
think we need to update and affirm the document's underlying principles if it is to be
binding on anyone living today." (footnote omitted)).
104 See, e.g., Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 723, 723 (1982).
BORK, supranote 61, at 145 ("'If the Constitution is law, then presuma105 See, e.g.,
bly its meaning, like that of all other law, is the meaning that the lawmakers were
understood to have intended .... There is no other sense in which the Constitution
can be what article VI proclaims it to be: 'Law'."').
106 Cass Sunstein's recent attack on originalism recognizes the contingency of constitutional theory, but without taking it far enough. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, A
CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS (2009) (identifying and analyzing the argument that if
many people think similarly, their judgment is entitled to respect and consideration).
He imagines four possible places or situations-Thayerville, Scalialand, Smallville,
and Olympus-in which different approaches to constitutional interpretation (deference to majorities, originalism, incremental minimalism, and moral readings of the
Constitution, respectively) would produce the best results. Id. at 20-22. We should
reject originalism and deference to majorities, he says, because the way our world
actually is, these methods of interpretation would produce bad results: "We may be in
Smallville; we may be in Olympus. But we are certainly not in Scalialand or
Thayerville." Id. at 32. Sunstein properly recognizes that whether a method of interpretation is proper is a contingent issue, depending on the details of what the actual
world is like. However, he fails to consider that whether or not our actual Constitution produces good results is itself contingent.
To be fair, Sunstein assumes that the proper approach to constitutional interpretation would necessarily produce good results only after he considers and briefly
rejects the idea that the Constitution defines its own nature: "If the founding document set out the rules for its own interpretation, judges would be bound by these
rules (though any such rules would themselves need to be construed). But the Constitution sets out no such rules." Id. at 23; see also id. at x (arguing that "[n]othing in
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the constitutional author whose intention some think is interpretively
binding might make it clear that it speaks only through a text, or
intergenerationally. The Constitution might explicitly make something "supreme law" that would not fall under legal philosophers'
10 7
favored account of the concept.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL INDEXICALS AS A BASIS FOR TEXTUALIST
SEMI-ORIGINALISM

Let us turn to the details of assessing the meaning of "this Constitution" in Article VI. Let me repeat the relevant text:
This Constitution . . .shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby ....
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution .... 108

What does "this Constitution" mean in Article VI?
the Constitution itself rules out any of the three approaches that I shall be exploring,"
but rather "[t]he Constitution does not set out the instructions for its own interpretation"). Of course, the point of this entire Article is that Sunstein is wrong about that.
It is also noteworthy that in assuming that the Constitution could prescribe rules for its
own interpretation, Sunstein implicitly rejects the argument made by many others
that such an assertion would be viciously circular. See infra Part III.B. Were Sunstein
to accept the argument I make here, he would presumably also accept that Article
VI's constitutional self-presentation would be binding even if it yielded bad results.
107 Mitchell Berman distinguishes "hard" from "soft" originalism based on
whether the basis for an interpretive approach is thought to follow necessarily from
the nature of interpretation or the nature of regarding a constitution as authoritative
(hard originalism) or whether it is based on the contingent costs and benefits of such
an approach (soft originalism). See Berman, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3)
("[O]riginalism is 'hard' when justified with reference to reasons that purport to
render it (in some sense) ineluctably true; it is soft when predicated on contingent
and contestable weighings of the costs and benefits of originalism relative to other
interpretive approaches."). Soft originalism includes "arguments . . . sounding in
democracy, the rule of law, the cabining of judicial discretion, and the like." Id.
(manuscript at 4). My argument based on Article VI falls into neither of these categories. Because Article VI could have been written in a way that adopts any of the seven
constitutional ontologies, the ontology that I believe it does adopt is in no sense necessarily true. However, neither is the constitutional self-presentation in Article VI simply one consideration among many, to be outweighed by competing normative
considerations. Even if another method of interpretation is more attractive or would
produce better results, interpreters who take the Article VI oath are not at liberty to
disagree with Article VI's constitutional self-presentation.
108 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2-3.
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The "This Union" Problem

While I will ultimately agree with Amar, Kesavan and Paulsen,
and Solum about the textualist and originalist lessons of the "this Constitution" provisions, 0 9 the short form of their argument fails. The
phrase "this Constitution" on its own is not inherently a textual or
historical self-reference, because the word "this" does not always refer
to a text or to the historical circumstance in which the text is spoken.
I can point to a Constitution and say "this Constitution is written in
black ink," but my words are not se/freferential-they do not refer to
the text of my sentence. When Justice Iredell said in Ware v. Hylton' 10
in 1796 that "[u]nder this Constitution therefore, so far as a treaty constitutionally is binding, upon principles of moral obligation, it is also by
the vigour of its own authority to be executed in fact,"' 1 he was
plainly not claiming that his Ware opinion was itself the Constitution,
or that the Constitution was historically confined to 1796. The
demonstrative "this," in that particular context, plainly points outside
the text and to a different time.
Indeed, we need look no further than the Constitution itself to
find alternate uses of the demonstrative "this." Article IV section 3
provides, "[n]ew States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union,"112 and Article I section 2 refers to "the several States which
may be included within this Union."113 Despite the demonstrative
"this," "this Union" is not composed of text, nor is it historically fixed.
A common law constitution might be seen as an institution roughly
akin to the Union: just as new states can be added to the Union without making it a new entity, new cases can be added to the Constitution
without any fundamental alteration. If the Union can be temporally
extended and nontextual despite the use of "this" to refer to it, perhaps the Constitution can too.
The bare use of "this Constitution" in Article VI, then, leaves our
constitutional ontology unspecified. However, a bit more digging can
pin the phrase down in both a textualist and historical way. In addition to considering constitutional indexicals in the federal Constitution, I will canvass state constitutions using the same phrase. Absent
evidence that state constitutions would use "this Constitution" differSee supra notes 7-9.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
Id. at 277 (first emphasis added).
112 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
113 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added); see also id. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .
(emphasis added)).
109
110
111
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ently from how that phrase is used in the Federal Constitution-and I
have encountered no such evidence-it seems reasonable to assume
the phrase refers to an entity of the same basic nature. Obviously,
"this Constitution" in the Illinois Constitution refers to the Illinois
Constitution, and not the Federal Constitution, but if there is good
reason to think that the demonstrative "this Constitution" is used in
the Illinois Constitution to refer to a historically situated text, there is
likewise good reason to think that "this Constitution" in the Federal
Constitution does likewise, albeit a different text uttered in a different
historic situation.
First I will present reasons why "this Constitution" is indeed binding in the way Article VI says, then reasons why "this Constitution" is a
constituting taking place at the constitutional text, and finally reasons
why "this Constitution" refers to the time of the Founding.
B.

"Shall Be Bound" and the Binding Constitution

Article VI says, of course, that "this Constitution" is binding law;
officials "shall be bound" to support it. The current form of the oath
required of federal officers reads:
I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the
duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me
1 14

God.

Taken at face value, the Constitution is plainly binding on officeholders who take the oath. The leading advocate of abandoning our
practice of always "invoking the authority of the Constitution," 11 5 Paul
Brest, briefly dismisses an argument for a binding Constitution from
the contemporary practice of taking the oath. He says, "It might be
thought that judges and other officials have expressly consented to be
bound by the Constitution by virtue of their oath of office 'to support
this Constitution.' But the oath must be understood in the context of
two centuries of constitutional decisionmaking."1 1 6
114 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006). This language was adopted in 1868. SeeAct ofJuly 11,
1868, ch. 139, 15 Stat. 85 (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 3331). Before then, the oath
was simply "I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support
the Constitution of the United States." Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 23, 23.
115 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
116 Brest, supra note 3, at 225 n.80 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3). Ethan Leib
likewise says that the oath leaves room for "taking the Constitution on terms other
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Brest seems to be suggesting that when contemporary officeholders take their oaths, they are not really taking the Constitution on its
own terms-that is, on the terms specified in Article VI making "this
Constitution" supreme. Contemporary officeholders might instead be
swearing to uphold a common law constitution when they refer to
"the Constitution," notwithstanding the possibility that Article VI
adopts a contrary definition of "this Constitution." However, Brest's
view is incompatible with how officeholders explain their own oaths.
Those explanations repeatedly and emphatically equate current oaths
with the requirement in Article VI. Senator Durbin, for instance, has
said:
There are so many things that divide us on the floor of the Senate,
between Republicans and Democrats, but there is one thing we are
united behind, and that is our oath of office. That oath of office is
explicit. This, in part, is what it says. Each of us takes this oath. To
the best of our ability we will:
...

preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United

States.
Isn't it interesting that when this Constitution was written, our
Founding Fathers wanted to make certain that whoever served as
President, Vice President, Member of the House or Senate, would
not swear their loyalty to the United States of America but would
swear their loyalty to this document. You could not become a Member of this body unless you were prepared, under oath, to say you
would preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States.
... [T] he oath of office which each of us takes is a reminder of
17
our solemn responsibility when it comes to this Constitution.'

Similarly, Senator Byrd has said:
Each of us took an oath under this Constitution. You took it in the
chair, Mr. President. Mr. Senator from Virginia, you took it. This is
the Constitution that James Madison from the State of Virginia
helped to write; that George Washington helped to write. We take
1 18
an oath to support and defend that Constitution.

than its own," because "[w]e have to know what the oath means." Posting of Ethan

Leib to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsbawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2OO6/O1/if-all-it
takes.html (Jan. 30, 2006, 18:28 EST) (comments by Chris at 17:09:17 EST and Ethan
Leib at 18:28:04 EST).
117

150

CONG.

REc. S7969 (daily ed. July 13, 2004) (statement of Sen. Durbin)

(first alteration in original).
118 148 CONG. REc. 20382 (2002) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
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Senator Kerry has said, "I took almost the same oath when I came
here to the Senate. The obligation is the same: to defend what the
Framers of the Constitution intended and never to give in to the passions of the moment .. ."119 Other examples of congressional representatives equating their oaths with the requirement of Article VI and
120
the historic Constitution are legion.
119
120

152 CONG. REC. S6522 (daily ed. June 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
Examples can be provided from every decade of our history. See, e.g.,
151
CONG. REC. H3105 (daily ed. May 10, 2005) (statement of Rep. Poe) ("Mr.
Speaker, ... [the] justices of the United States Supreme Court take [the judicial oath]
to uphold America's Constitution, the sacred manuscript our Nation was established
upon, the foundation of who we are."); 139 CONG. REC. 2391 (1993) (speech by Sen.
Simon introduced as exhibit) ("As senators we take only one oath, to 'support and
defend the Constitution.' The Constitution says that we in Congress 'shall be bound
by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution.' Cynics say that we will just
ignore the Constitution. While I differ with many of my colleagues on a host of issues,
I do not believe that anyone here will say, 'Let's just ignore the Constitution.'"); 132
CONG. REc. 15401 (1986) (letter of Senators Kennedy, Leahy, Biden, Metzenbaum,
and Simon) ("The Constitution is a self-executing document and its viability as the
'supreme law of the land' depends on the fidelity and faithfulness of those who are
entrusted with governmental power.... To ensure that such persons remain faithful
to their trust, Article VI of the Constitution specifies that [an oath or affirmation will
be given to support the Constitution]."); 116 CONG. REc. 12268 (1970) (statement of
Rep. Flowers) ("[T]he Constitution of the United States provides that a Supreme
Court Justice . . .shall be bound 'by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution'.... As a Representative in Congress and sworn to do my duty under this same
Constitution ...this requires me tojoin in the resolution .... ); 110 CONG. REc. 2472
(1964) (statement of Rep. Matthews) ("[A]rticle VI, clause 3, requires that Senators
and Representatives, among others, [shall be bound by an oath to support the Constitution] .... In conformity with the constitutional mandate, each and every Member
of this House has repeated those most familiar words [then quoting the oath language]."); 96 CONG. REC. 6553 (1950) (statement of Rep. Plumley) ("The oath of
office taken by the Members of the House is administered by the Speaker, and by the
Vice President to the Senators .... The Constitution provides that the President of
the United States, Senators, Representatives, members of the several State legislatures,
and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution."); 86 CONG.
REC. app. 1493 (1940) (statement of Rep. Thorkelson) ("[The first two paragraphs of
Article VI] should be quite convincing as to the document upon which the laws of the
United States shall be made and upon which the judges of every State shall be bound.
It should also be informative to other officials, as stated in this quotation."); 72 CONG.
REc. 8445 (1930) (statement of Sen. Shortridge) (" [W]e are guided, we are bound,
under our oaths .... ); 62 CONG. REc. 1791 (1922) (statement of Rep. Bankhead)
("The primary, and what should be the absolutely conclusive, test before we should

proceed any further is, Is the bill within the warrant of the constitutional powers
granted to Congress by the people and the States? . . . [T]here is higher authority
than the spoken words of any man, living or dead, upon the necessity of that inexorable inquiry. I refer to section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution itself .. ");48 CONG.
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REc.1913 (1912) (statement of Rep. Dies) ("[H]aving sworn to support the Constitution, I felt it my duty to vote against the proposition.... [After quoting Article II on
the treaty power:] This, Mr. Speaker, is the fundamental law of the land. The Constitution further requires that [then quoting Article VI]."); 33 CONG. REc. 1126 (1900)
(statement of Rep. Snodgrass) ("[Article VI] .. .makes it mandatory, not discretionary, that [members of Congress] be bound by oath."); 22 CONG. REc. 326 (1890)
(statement of Rep. Wilson) ("The intent [of a meeting of senators from states on the
brink of secession] was to induce all of said State officers to join in and promote the
conspiracy which that meeting represented, notwithstanding the Constitution of the
United States declared [in Article VI that they were bound to support the Constitution] .... The State officers appealed to by it surrendered their consciences and
violated their oaths of office. They joined the conspiracy whose purpose it was to
destroy the Government whose Constitution they were sworn to support .... ); 18
CONG. REc. 1157 (1887) (statement of Rep. Hammond) ("Under that requirement
[of Article VI] the Representatives in the First Congress took said oath, pursuant to a
resolution of the House, administered by the chancellor of NewYork."); 9 CONG. REC.
750-51 (1879) (statement of Rep. Robeson) ("Suprema lex! What issupreme law? It is
a law which has the power to execute itself upon citizens and property.... We, when
we stand up before the Speaker's desk and raise our hands to Heaven and bind our
governmental duty by the solemnity of an oath fast to the throne of the eternal God,
swear to do what? Not to sustain the constitution and laws of any State, but the Constitution and laws of the United States."); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2142
(1868) (statement of Rep. Plants) ("There can be no State government, in the American sense of that term, without ... legislative, judicial, and executive officers duly
elected and qualified to exercise these several functions. And, sir, one of the absolutely essential qualifications is the being 'bound' by oath or affirmation to support
the Constitution. It is not enough that he simply take the oath. He must be bound by
voluntary assent. In article six of the Constitution will be found [the] emphatic
words.... This is the supreme law of every State. Without this 'binding' there can be
no such thing as a Legislature."); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1855) (statement of Rep. Stewart) ("Was it ever conceived by the framers of the Constitution, or
by the national Legislative Council of 1789, that such a state of things as this [lack of a
speaker to administer the oaths] should exist? The Constitution of the United States
.. .declares that the State and National officers, before they shall undertake the
exercise of any trust, or the discharge of any responsibility, shall take an oath to support the Constitution.... I apprehend there is a great duty which we owe to the
country. There is a high duty which we have to discharge."); CONG. GLOBE, 27th
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 315 (1841) (statement of Rep. Hastings) ("My constituents did
not send me here to be guided by precedent, no matter how imposing or high in his
country's estimation the example; they sent me here to do their will under the Constitution-that instrument to be my text-book, irrespective of precedent. Preparatory to
entering on my duties, I pledged myself, under the solemnity of an oath, to support
the Constitution, and it is unnecessary to declare that I will adhere to it to the best of
myjudgment.... The Constitution will be my reference.... I will confine myself...
to the instrument that was planned by sages and patriots, at a moment that they had
the freedom and happiness of mankind deeply at heart; those great men, just
emerged from the perils of the Revolution . . . ."); 14 REG. DEB. 1602 (1837) (statement of Rep. Moore) ("What is required of us before entering upon our duties as
representatives? It is required, by [Article VI of the constitution]. Sir, the requisition

2009]

CONSTITUTIONAL

INDEXICALS

1647

Brest supplements this argument with a reference to Judge Gibson's anti-Marburiy21 view of the oath in 1825's Eakin v. Raub.122 However, Gibson's comments concern the occasions for constitutional
interpretation, not its proper method. Even if Marbuyy is somehow
wrong, and Gibson is right that courts should enforce statutes they
think might be unconstitutional, Article VI would still require officeholders to obey "this Constitution." Indeed, Gibson himself is
emphatic that the Constitution is binding and unchanging:
The constitution is a collection of fundamental laws, not to be
departed from in practice, nor altered by judicial decision, and in
the construction of it, nothing would be so alarming as the doctrine
of communis error, which affords a ready justification for every usur123
pation that has not been resisted in limine."

is emphatic and positive-couched in language not to be misunderstood. Our duty is
palpable; we cannot err ignorantly."); 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 173 (1824) (statement of
Sen. Benton) ("Upon this [Article VI] oath, each person intrusted with the great duty
of expounding the Constitution, is bound to go back to the words of the instrument
itself, whenever a question of construction arises. He may and ought to consult the
opinions of others, in order to enlighten his own. He may quote the opinions of
others to give greater weight to his own; but he cannot surrender his own in favor of
another, which he believes to be wrong, without disregarding the obligation by which
he has bound himself to support the Constitution."); 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1445
(1818) (statement of Rep. Anderson) (quoting phrasing of Article VI regarding
whether status as representative begins before or after taking the oath); 13 ANNALS OF
CONG. 730 (1803) (statement of Rep. Taggart) ("[S]o far as it respects myself the
consideration of taking a solemn oath to support the Constitution of the United
States is of considerable weight. I cannot see how I could act consistently in taking
such an oath to day, and endeavoring to introduce an alteration in one of its important principles and provisions to-morrow."); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 269 (1789) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) ("[T]he persons who are to take
this oath in conformity to the Constitution, will conceive themselves, after having
taken such oath, under an obligation to support the Constitution.... If the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, every part of it must partake of this supremacy;
consequently, every general declaration it contains is the supreme law.").
121 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (utilizing the oath of
office, including the requirement that judges act according to the Constitution, as
support for the principle of judicial review).
122 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 352-53 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson,J., dissenting) ("The oath to
support the constitution is not peculiar to the judges, but is taken indiscriminately by
every officer of the government, and is designed rather as a test of the political principles of the man, than to bind the officer in the discharge of his duty; otherwise it were
difficult to determine what operation it is to have in the case of a recorder of deeds,
for instance, who in the execution of his office has nothing to do with the constitution."); see Brest, supra note 3, at 225 n.80.
123 Eakin, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 345.
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Gibson's point is that, constitutionally, judges may only exercise
judicial power, and he thought that power did not extend to passing
judgment on the constitutionality of statutes. Given that view, it was
precisely the fact that Gibson thought he was bound to obey the Constitution itself, rather than later judicial glosses, that made him resist
judicial review despite almost everyone else's disagreement. For Brest
to suggest on the basis of Judge Gibson's opinion that the oath is itself
"altered by judicial decision"' 24 is ironic.

Article VI is, then, both a part of the Constitution and an
extremely prominent part of our contemporary political and legal culture. To contend that contemporary oaths refer to something other
than Article VI's "this Constitution" is simply to mischaracterize our
present culture. Of course, there are surely other elements of our
current legal culture inconsistent with the Constitution, properly
interpreted. To the extent that officeholders support such constitutional violations and yet continue to believe that we obey Article VI,
they are being inconsistent. They can either eliminate the inconsistency by eliminating the unconstitutional practices or by abandoning
the Article VI oath. But to pretend, as Brest seems to, that the current
Article VI oath does not really refer to the same thing that Article VI
does, is inconsistent with the predominant attitude of officeholders
themselves.
C.

Textualism

Moving to the substance of the constitutional indexicals, I will
attempt to show first how textualism, and then a historically confined
Constitution, are embodied in Article VI. The burden of the textualist component of my inquiry is to show that the constitutional text, not
the original purposes or the original expected applications, is the
actual "this Constitution." As explained above, it might be possible to
see the common law constitution, the contemporary meaning constitution, or the moral principle constitution as forms of textualism,
albeit forms of textualism in which the text is authored by an
intergenerational common law process, by citizens today, or by a succession of moral philosophers. The next section, arguing for a historically confined Constitution, will attempt to eliminate these
possibilities. This subsection, however, argues that the text, rather
than expected applications or ultimate purposes, is "this
Constitution."
124 See Brest, supra note 3, at 225 n.80 ("But the oath must be understood in the
context of two centuries of constitutional decisionmaking.").
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Here Is the Constitution: "This" and Forms of "Here"

Many clauses in the federal and state constitutions use indexicals
of location, referring to what takes place "herein," or what it specified
in "foregoing" sections. The Philadelphia Convention's cover letter to
the Constitution, which accompanied the delivery of the text of the
Constitution to Congress meeting in New York, refers to the "the
preceeding Constitution," equating it to the object of ratification and
to "this Constitution":
Resolved, That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the

United States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of
this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof,
under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and
Ratification; and that each Convention assenting to, and ratifying
the Same, should give Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as soon
as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution,
the United States in Congress assembled should fix a Day on which
the Electors should be appointed by the States which shall have ratified the same, and a Day on which the Electors should assemble to
vote for the President, and the Time and Place for commencing
Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication
the Electors should be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the
Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators
and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place
assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and counting the
Votes for President; and, that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to
125

execute this Constitution.

Note that the cover letter equates "the preceeding Constitution" with
"it" and "the Same" and "this Constitution." Neither purposes nor
expected applications precede this resolution, only the text.
Some state constitutions, and official documents following the
constitutions, say "here is the Constitution" even more explicitly. The
125 See 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINEwrAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 501 (Roscoe R.
Hill ed., 1936) (second, third, fourth, sixth, and seventh emphases added); see also 2
MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEwnON 665-66 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937) (text following the Constitution spelling "preceeding" as "preceding").

1650

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 84:4

attestation clause following the official copy of the New Jersey Constitution of 1844 says, "I, George Wurts, Secretary of State of the State of
NewJersey, do hereby certify theforegoing to be a true copy of the Constitution of the State of NewJersey as amended, as the same is taken from
and compared with the original Constitution and amendments
thereto, now remaining on file in my office." 126 The Constitution is

the foregoing text. The Constitution of Alabama's separation of powers provision refers to "the instances in this Constitution hereinafter
expressly directed or permitted," 12 7 both presupposing that "herein"
is the location of "this Constitution" and that the Constitution per128
forms its tasks "expressly," i.e., textually.
Several state constitutions likewise refer to "the following constitution."129 What follows is not a purpose or an expected application,
but a text. The Alaska Constitution refers to ordinances "appended to
this constitution.' 130 Obviously, these ordinances are not appended
to the ultimate purposes or expected applications of the constitution;
they are appended to the text. The Illinois and Montana constitutions
refer to particular "following" provisions being "part of this Constitu126 NJ. CONST. of 1844 (attestation clause of Secretary of State George Wurts)
(emphasis added).
127 ALA. CONST. art. III, § 43 (emphasis added).
128 For more argument based on "expressly," see infra Part II.C.5.
129 ALA. CONST. of 1861, pmbl. ("We the People of the State of Alabama .. . do
ordain and establish the following Constitution . . . ."); ALA. CONST. of 1819, pmbl.
("We, the people of the Alabama Territory... do ordain and establish the following
constitution .... "); ARK. CONST. of 1836, pmbl. ("We, the people of the Territory of
Arkansas... do ordain and establish the following constitution. . . ."); CONN. CONST.
of 1818, pmbl. ("The people of Connecticut ...

hereby ...

ordain and establish the

following Constitution .... "); FLA. CONST. of 1865, pmbl. ("We, the people of the
State of Florida... do mutually agree, each with the other, to form the following
constitution . . . ."); ILL. CONST. of 1818, pmbl. ("The people of the Illinois Territory... do, by their representatives in convention, ordain and establish the following
constitution .... ."); IND. CONST. of 1816, pmbl. ("We the Representatives of the people of the Territory of Indiana . . . do ordain and establish the following constitution . . . ."); LA. CoNsT. of 1812, pmbl. ("We, the Representatives of the People of all
that part of the Territory or country ceded under the name of Louisiana . . . do
ordain and establish the following constitution . . . ."); ME. CoNsT. pmbl. ("We, the
); MICH.
people of Maine ... do ordain and establish the following constitution ....
CONST. of 1835, pmbl. ("We, the people of the Territory of Michigan ... do ordain
and establish the following constitution .... ."); Miss. CONST. of 1817, pmbl. ("We, the
representatives of the people inhabiting the western part of the Mississippi territory.., do ordain and establish the following constitution.. . ."); OHIO CONST. of
1802, pmbl. ("We, the people of the eastern division of the territory of United States
northwest of the river Ohio . . . do ordain and establish the following
constitution .... ").
130 ALASKA CONST. art. XV, § 24.

20091

tion."

CONSTITUTIONAL

31

INDEXICALS

Again, the text, arranged spatially on the page, is what "fol-

lows." The Alabama Constitution refers to the "preceding section or
elsewhere in this Constitution.'1 3 2 The Kentucky Constitution says,
"We, the representatives of the people of Kentucky... do ordain and
proclaim the foregoingto be the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
1 33
Kentucky from and after this date.
Further, an examination of "here" and other spatial indexicals in
the Federal Constitution makes clear both that "here" refers to the
text, and that the jobs performed "herein" are the same jobs performed by "this Constitution." In effect, by saying both that the constitutional text is "here," and "here" is the Constitution, the
Constitution is saying that the constitutional text is "this Constitution."
The drafters of the Constitution could have used "here" to refer
to Philadelphia, of course, or more narrowly to Independence Hall.
They could have used it to refer to the entire territory of the United
States. But it is clear that they used it to refer to the constitutional
text. Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 refers to the "the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken,"1 3 4 referring to Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3, which appears "herein before"'1 35 textually. Article
I, Section 8, Clause 18 refers to "the foregoing Powers," which are foregoing textually.13 6 The conclusion to the Constitution says, "In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names," followed by
the thirty-nine signatures. 13 7 The location of "hereunto" is the location of the signatures-that is, in the text. Several state constitutions
likewise use the term "expressly" in relation to a form of "here" that
makes clear "here" refers to the text.13 8 If things done "here" are
131 ILL. CONST. transition sched. ("The following Schedule Provisions shall remain
part of this Constitution until their terms have been executed."); MONT. CONST. transition sched. ("The following provisions shall remain part of this Constitution until
their terms have been executed.").
132 ALA. CONST. art. VII, § 174 (emphasis added).
133 Ky. CONST. ordinance (emphasis added).
134 U.S. CONsT. art I, § 9, cl. 4.
135 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
136 Id art I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). "Foregoing" is related to "here" because
it is an indexical of location-understanding it requires understanding where the
speaker is situating himself-that is, what the speaker would mean by "here."
137 Id. art VII (emphasis added).
138 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 546 (referring to taxation amount "expressly provided herein"); ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. II, § 2 (referring in separation of powers
provision to "instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted"); ARK.CONsT. art.
II, § 23 (power of taxation and eminent domain "is herein fully and expressly conceded"); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 24 (referring in separation of powers provision
to "instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."); FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3
(referring to cases "expressly provided herein"); FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. VIII,
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done "expressly," then "here" is obviously the location of the
39

text. 1

"Here" and "this Constitution" are linked in the Federal Constitution because they are both the location of the constitutional vestings
of power. Article I, Section 1 provides: "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States .... ,,40 But
Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 grants Congress power "[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoingPowers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitutionin the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof."'141 Two aspects of the Sweeping Clause tie "here" to "this
Constitution." First, the reference to "other" powers implies that the
"foregoing" powers are part of the "powers vested by this Constitution." Second, the "vesting" of powers is accomplished both "herein"
§ 11(5) (1956) (referring to what is "expressly authorized herein"); ILL. CONST. of
1818, art. I, § 2 (referring to what is "hereinafter expressly directed or permitted");
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. II (referring to "instances herein expressly permitted"); IOWA
CONST. of 1846, art. III, § 1 (referring to "cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted"); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. IV, § 12 (referring to cases "hereinafter expressly
provided"); Ky. CONST. § 153 (referring to what is "herein expressly provided"); Ky.
CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 2 (referring to "instances hereinafter expressly permitted");
LA. CONST. of 1812, art. I, § 2 (referring to "instances hereinafter expressly directed
or permitted"); ME. CONST. art. III, § 2 (referring to "cases herein expressly directed
or permitted"); MD. CONST. art. XV, § 9 (referring to "cases otherwise expressly provided herein"); id. art. IV, pt. V, § 41-A(3) (other provisions are "hereby expressly
made applicable"); Miss. CONST. of 1817, art. II, § 2 (referring to "instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted"); NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1 (amended 1996) (referring to "cases herein expressly directed or permitted"); id. art. V, § 12 (referring to
what is "herein expressly provided"); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. III, § 1 (referring to
what is "herein expressly provided"); OHIO CONST. art. II, § 32 (referring to what is
"herein expressly conferred"); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 18 (conflicting provisions are
"hereby expressly repealed"); S.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 (referring to what is "hereby
expressly authorized"); TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. II (referring to "instances herein
expressly permitted"); UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1 (referring to "cases herein expressly
directed or permitted").
139 Is the omission of "expressly" from the Federal Constitution a good argument
that the Federal Constitution is not a text? John Marshall argued that the omission of
"expressly" from the Tenth Amendment counsels for a broader construction of federal power than that allowed under the Articles of Confederation. McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06 (1819). However, Marshall's point was that
Congress could employ powers implied by those which were set out explicitly, not that
the Constitution was not itself a text. The lack of an expression like "expressly in this
Constitution" in the Federal Constitution means that I must look elsewhere to assess
the meaning of the phrase "this Constitution," but it is not itself a reason to think that
the Constitution is not a text.
140 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § I (emphasis added).
141 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
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(in Article I, Section 1) and "by this Constitution" (in the Sweeping
Clause). That would only make sense if "here" and "this Constitution"
refer to the same entity-the text.
The Eighteenth Amendment likewise uses the two indexicals
"this" and "here" to refer to the same action, in effect saying "here is
this article." Manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcohol is
"hereby prohibited," 142 says Section 1, but Section 3 says that unless
ratified in seven years, "[t] his article shall be inoperative. '143 Because
the "operative" part of the amendment is in Section 1, "this article"
does what is done "hereby." The text tells us, "Here is this article."
The use of indexicals like "here" to express spatial relationship of
bits of the Constitution does not fit with either of the two historical,
nontextualist forms of constitutional ontology. Purposes and expectations about applications exist in the minds of framers or others, not
"here," in the text. Neither purposes nor expected applications are
related by words like "foregoing" or "preceding."
2.

"Enumeration in the Constitution"

The Ninth Amendment has been much discussed as a source or
recognition of unenumerated rights. Without resolving that debate, I
only want to point out a simple feature of the Amendment that confirms that the Constitution itself is a text. The Amendment refers to
"the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights. 1

44

The Consti-

tution therefore must be the sort of entity that can enumerate
rights-that is, list them textually. An ultimate purpose, or an
expected application, cannot contain an enumeration; only a text can
do that.
Of course, much remains to be said about what exactly the Ninth
Amendment means. But it plainly confirms, and does not contradict,
the proposition that the Constitution contains an enumeration of
rights-that is, that the Constitution itself is textual. It is consistent
with a fully textual Constitution that judges have the power to consider unenumerated rights, for instance, in construing statutes, or in
construing what "proper" means in the Sweeping Clause, or even in
striking down legislation. 145 The Ninth Amendment does not say that
142 Id. amend. XVIII, § 1 (repealed 1933).
143 Id. amend. XVIII, § 3 (repealed 1933) (emphasis added).
144 Id. amend. IX (emphasis added).
145 Even if unenumerated rights were superior to statutes, they might be distinct
from the Constitution and subordinate to it. The textual Constitution might then
take first place, unenumerated rights second, and legislation third. Such an arrangement would not make unenumerated rights literally part of what "the Constitution"
refers to, but would only cause uneumerated rights to rank higher than legislation.
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the Constitutionis not a list; it actually confirms that the Constitution is
a textual list, but forbids that list from being interpreted in a particular way. State constitutions contain similar "enumeration" language
146
regarding "this Constitution."
3.

Engrossing "This Constitution" on Parchment

The Maine Constitution of 1819 makes perfectly plain that "this
Constitution" is the text: "This constitution shall be enrolled on
parchment, deposited in the secretary's office, and be the supreme
law of the State, and printed copies thereof shall be prefixed to the
books containing the laws of this State." 147 The Oklahoma Constitution of 1907 provides similarly, 1 48 as does the New Hampshire Consti-

tution of 1784 regarding "this form of government."'149 The material
146 See ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 21 (referring to "[t]he enumeration of rights in this
constitution"); id. art. XII, § 8 ("The enumeration of specified powers in this constitution shall not be construed as limiting the powers of the State."); ARIz. CONST. art. II,
§ 33 (referring to "[t]he enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights"); id. art.
II, § 2.1 (E) (referring to "[t]he enumeration in this constitution of certain rights for
Victims"); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 28 (referring to "[t]he enumeration in this constitution of certain rights"); HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (referring to "[t]he enumeration
in this constitution of specified powers"); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (referring to "[t]he
enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights"); id. art. II, § 2 (referring to "[t] he
enumeration in this Constitution of specified powers and functions"); MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 23 (referring to "[t]he enumeration in this constitution of certain rights");
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 34 (same); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 23 (same); OKLA. CONST. art.
II, § 33 (same); id. art. II, § 34, cl. D (referring to "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights for victims"); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(c) (same).
147 ME. CONST. art. X, § 6 (amended 1875, 1950, and 1967). The current language provides:
And the draft [of the Constitution], and arrangement, when approved
by the Legislature, shall be enrolled on parchment and deposited in the
office of the Secretary of State; and printed copies thereof shall be prefixed
to the books containing the laws of the State. And the constitution, with the
amendments made thereto, in accordance with the provisions thereof, shall
be the supreme law of the State.
Id.
148 OKLA. CONST. sched., § 43 ("When this Constitution shall have been ratified by
the people of the State of Oklahoma and the State admitted into the Federal Union,
under the same, as engrossed on parchment and signed by the officers and members
of this Constitutional Convention, it shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of
State and sacredly preserved by him, as the fundamental law of the State of
Oklahoma.").
149 N.H. CONST. of 1784, part II, art. 101 ("This form of government shall be
enrolled on parchment, and deposited in the secretary's office, and be a part of the
laws of the land, and printed copies thereof shall be prefixed to the books containing
the laws of this State in all future editions thereof.").
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accompanying the copy of the original Montana Constitution of 1889
speaks of the "annexed and foregoing Constitution" being a "transcript," plainly a text.1 50 Again, I find no reason to think that these
usages of "this Constitution" are idiosyncratic; in lieu of such evidence, the federal "this Constitution" seems plainly to be a text as
well.
4.

"This Constitution" as Composed of Language

Several constitutions make clear that "this constitution" is composed of language, by speaking straightforwardly of terms "used in this
constitution." 15' The Mississippi Constitution speaks of amendments
being "inserted as a part of this Constitution," 152 which would only
make sense if the Constitution is textual; purposes or expected applications are not "inserted," only language. The New Jersey Constitution refers to a "paragraph becoming part of this Constitution.

'153

If

"this Constitution" is the sort of thing that can contain terms and
paragraphs, it is a text.
5.

"This Constitution" Performing Actions "Expressly"

Many state constitutions refer to "this Constitution" doing things
"expressly"-that is, textually, through linguistically expressed mean150 MONT. CONST. of 1889 (attestation clause of Secretary of State Walker) ("I,
Louis A. Walker, Secretary of the Territory of Montana, do hereby certify that I have
compared the annexed andforegoing Constitution of the State of Montana, as adopted
by the Montana Constitutional Convention of 1889, with the original thereof, filed in
my office on the 17th day of August, A. D. 1889, and that the same is a correct transcript therefrom, and of the whole of said original Constitution." (emphasis added)).
151 ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 3 ("Service in the armed forces of the United States
or of the State is not an office or position of profit as the term is used in this constitution."); id. art. XII, § 10 ("Personal pronouns used in this constitution shall be construed as including either sex."); id. art. XII, § 11 ("As used in this constitution, the
terms 'by law' and 'by the legislature,' or variations of these terms, are used interchangeably . . . ."); ARiz. CONsT. art. VI.1, § 5 ("The term 'judge' as used in this
article .... "); HAw. CONST. art. XIV, § 12 ("Whenever any personal pronoun appears
in this constitution, it shall be construed to mean either sex."); Ky. CONST. § 208
(repealed 2002) ("The word corporation as used in this Constitution .... "); N.M.
CONsT. art. VII, § 2 (referring to "wherever the masculine gender is used in this Constitution"); PA. CONST. sched., § 33 (referring to "[t]he words 'county commissioners,'
whenever used in this Constitution"); W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 32 (referring to
"[w]henever the words, 'a majority of the members elected to either House of the
Legislature,' or words of like import, are used in this Constitution").
152 MIsS. CONST. art. 15, § 273.
153 NJ. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, para. 6 (referring to indebtedness incurred "prior to
this paragraph becoming part of this Constitution").

1656

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

84:4

ing.1 54 The Articles of Confederation do the same regarding "this
Confederation."15 5 If "this Constitution" refers to the same sort of
entity in both state constitutions and the federal one, then the Federal
Constitution is clearly a text.

154 See, e.g.,
ALA. CONST. art. III, § 43 (referring to "the instances in this Constitution hereinafter expressly directed or permitted"); ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 6 (refer-

ring to cases "expressly directed or permitted by this constitution"); id. art. XIX, § 9
("The general assembly shall have no power to create any permanent State office not
expressly provided for by this constitution."); COLO. CONST. art. III (powers separated

"except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted"); id. art. XIV, §
6
(1902) (amended 2000) (making exception "as hereafter otherwise expressly directed
or permitted by constitutional enactment"); DEL. CONST. of 1831, sched., § 10 ("[N]o
office shall be vacated by the amendment to this constitution, unless the same be
expressly vacated thereby."); FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. II, § 1 (1962) (referring to
"cases expressly provided by this constitution"); FLA. CONST.of 1838, art. II, § 2 (referring to "the instances expressly provided in this constitution"); IDAHO CONST. art. II,

§ 1 (referring to what is "in this Constitution expressly directed or permitted"); IND.
CONST. art. II, § 9 (referring to what is "in this Constitution expressly permitted"); id.
art. III, § 1 (referring to what is "in this Constitution expressly provided"); IND.
CONST. of 1816, art. XI, § 13 (referring to what "in this Constitution is expressly permitted"); Ky. CONST. § 60 (referring to what is "expressly provided in this Constitution"); MICH. CONST. art. III, § 2 (referring to what is "expressly provided in this
constitution"); MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. IV, § 2 (referring to "cases expressly provided in this constitution"); id. art. V, § 9 (referring to "perquisites of the office not
expressly authorized by this constitution"); id. art. X, § 11 (referring to "such debts as
are expressly authorized in this constitution"); MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, § 15
(referring to "perquisites of office, not expressly authorized by this constitution."); id.
art. XIV, § 7 (referring to "such debts as are expressly authorized in this constitution"); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. III (referring to "such cases as are expressly pro-

vided for in this constitution"); MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. III, § 1 (referring to
"instances expressly provided in this constitution."); MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1 (referring to what is "in this constitution expressly directed or permitted"); MONT.CONST.
of 1889, art. IV, § 1 (same); NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (amended 1996) (referring

to "cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution"); NJ. CONST. art. III, § 1
(referring to what is "expressly provided in this Constitution"); id. art. IV, § 7, para. 11
(referring to "the powers expressly conferred, or essential thereto, and not inconsistent with or prohibited by this Constitution"); N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1 (referring to
what is "in this constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted"); S.C. CONST.
of 1868, art. IX, § 10 (referring to "debts as are expressly authorized in this Constitution"); W. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 21 (referring to what is "expressly prohibited by this
constitution"); Wyo. CONST. art. II, § 1 (referring to what is "in this constitution
expressly directed or permitted").
155 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (U.S. 1781) (reserving to the states "every
power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated
to the United States").
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Semi-Originalism: The Historically Confined, Nonintergenerational
ConstitutionalAuthor

Of the seven possible competitor constitutional ontologies I consider here, I take the material above to exclude three of them-the
nonbinding Constitution and the Constitution as original ultimate
purposes or original tangible applications. The four theories that
remain are forms of textualism-my theory of the Constitution as historic, textually expressed sense, and three theories that allow later
evolution to attach meaning to the constitutional text, through either
moral theorizing, common law processes, or linguistic evolution. I
will highlight several factors that make very clear that "this Constitution" is a constituting that happens at the time of the Founding, not
intergenerationally or with each successive moment. Combining such
a historic-Constitution conclusion with the textualist lesson above
reveals that the Constitution is a historic textual event, textually
expressing meaning at a particular time-the Founding.
1.

The Distinction Between "Ourselves" and "Our Posterity," and
Ratifying Conventions as "We the People"

Justice Breyer contends that the preambulatory "We" refers to
people today. "[The Framers] wrote a Constitution that begins with
the words 'We the People.' The words are not 'we the people of
1787."'156 Breyer quotes Alexander Meiklejohn's parsing of the Preamble: "In those words it is agreed, and with every passing moment it
is reagreed, that the people of the United States shall be self-governed." 157 Meiklejohn thus imagines people today acting as the constitutional author by speaking the Preamble each moment.
Accordingly, he thinks that we today are the ones to attach meaning
to the text of the Constitution. 158 RecallJed Rubenfeld's similar argument that the preambulatory "We" is intergenerational: "If self-government is a generation-spanning project, there must be a generationspanning subject of this project. This subject I call a people ...
[T]he idea of an inter-generational 'people' is well known to American constitutional thought. The Constitution seems to claim such a
people as its author." 159 The tide of Justice Brennan's famous 1985
speech-"The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifi156 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 25 (2005).
157 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 86, at 18, quoted in BREYER, supra note 156, at 25.
158 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
159 Rubenfeld, Reading, supra note 93, at 1146. Rubenfeld then cites the Preamble. Id. at 1146 n.99.
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cation"' 6 0-suggests a similar interpretation of Article VII. Taken seriously, contemporary ratification means contemporary constitutional
authorship.I 61
The precise identity of "We the People" and their precise location
in history is critical to an assessment of "this Constitution," because
the Preamble says that "We the People... do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America."1 62 "We the People"
are the ones who ordain and establish the Constitution. If, as argued
above, being bound by the Constitution means being bound by the
Constitution's meaning, and not just bound by the physical text, then
the ordaining-and-establishing "We the People" must be the ones who
attach meaning to that text.
So who are "We the People"? An intergenerational constitutional
author does not fit with the actual words of the Preamble. The operative language is: "We the People. . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." However, among the
purposes of the Constitution is "to secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity."163 The distinction between "ourselves"that is, the "We the People" who ordain and establish the Constitution-and "our Posterity"-that is, later generations-is in considerable tension with the idea of an intergenerational constitutional
author. If the constitutional author were already intergenerational,
and "We the People" were pronouncing the words of the Constitution
over the entire course of American history, then there would be no
need to refer separately to "our Posterity," because they would already
be included within the constitutional author. Simply referring to
"ourselves" would be sufficient, if Rubenfeld's reading of the Pream164
ble were correct.
Many state constitutions likewise refer to "ourselves and our posterity." 165 Several state constitutions make the distinction between the
160 WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REv. 433 (1986).
161 In fairness to Brennan, he does not give any exegesis of the idea in his title,
and it is difficult to tell how literally he takes it.
162

U.S. CONST. pmbl.

163 Id. (emphasis added).
164 Randy Barnett briefly alludes to a similar reading of the Preamble based on the
"our posterity" reference, though he does not use the point to argue that the constitutional author includes only the Founders. See BARNETr, supra note 103, at 20 n.22
("[I]n the Preamble to the Constitution, the framers did not purport to bind their
posterity but rather to secure for it 'the Blessings of Liberty.'").
165 See, e.g., ALA. CONST.pmbl. (stating that the purpose is to "secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity"); ALA. CONST. of 1819, pmbl. (stating that the
purpose is to "secure to ourselves and our posterity the rights of life, liberty, and
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constitutional author and later generations more explicit, referring to
"this generation," "succeeding generations," 166 "present and future
property"); ARK. CONST. pmbl. ("We, the People of the State of Arkansas, grateful to
Almighty God for the privilege of choosing our own form of Government; for our civil
and religious liberty; and desiring to perpetuate its blessings and secure the same to
ourselves and our posterity ....
"); Apm. CONST. of 1836, pmbl. (stating that the purpose is to "secure to ourselves and our posterity the enjoyment of all the rights of life,
liberty, and property, and the free pursuit of happiness"); COLO. CONST. pmbl. (stating that the purpose is to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity"); FLA. CONST. of 1865, pmbl. (stating that the purpose is to "secure to ourselves
and our posterity the enjoyment of all the rights of life, liberty, and property, and the
pursuit of happiness"); ILL. CONST. pmbl. (stating that the purpose is to "secure the
blessings of freedom and liberty to ourselves and our posterity"); ILL. CONST. of 1818,
pmbl. ("The people of the Illinois Territory... in order to... secure the blessings of
liberty to themselves and their posterity . . . ."); IND. CONST. of 1816, pmbl. (stating
that the purpose is to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity");
LA. CONST.

of 1868, pmbl. (same);

ME. CONST.

of 1819, pmbl. (stating that the pur-

pose is to "secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of liberty"); MICH.
CONST. pmbl. ("We, the people of the state of Michigan, grateful to Almighty God for
the blessings of freedom, and earnestly desiring to secure these blessings undiminished to ourselves and our posterity ....
");MINN. CONST. pmbl. ("We, the people of
the State of Minnesota, grateful to God for our civil and religious liberty, and desiring
to perpetuate its blessings and secure the same to ourselves and our posterity ....");
N.C. CONST. pmbl. ("We, the people of the State of North Carolina, grateful to
Almighty God, the Sovereign Ruler of Nations, for the preservation of the American
Union and the existence of our civil, political and religious liberties, and acknowledging our dependence upon Him for the continuance of those blessings to us and our
posterity ....
"); OHIO CONST. of 1802, pmbl. (stating that the purpose is to "secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity"); PA. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.
(" [I]
t is our indispensable duty to establish such original principles of government, as
will best promote the general happiness of the people of this State, and their posterity ....); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I (stating that the purpose is "effectually to secure
the religious and political freedom established by our venerated ancestors, and to
preserve the same for our posterity"); S.C. CONST. of 1868, pmbl. (stating they were
"forming a new Constitution of civil government for ourselves and posterity"); S.D.
CONST. pmbl. (stating that the purpose is to "preserve to ourselves and to our posterity the blessings of liberty"); TEX. CONST. of 1868, art. 1 (stating that the purpose is
that "great principles of liberty and equality [be] secured to us and our posterity");
Wvo. CONST. of 1889, pmbl. ("We, the People of the State of Wyoming, grateful to
God for our civil, political and religious liberties, and desiring to secure them to ourselves and perpetuate them to our posterity.").
166 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 543, § 1 (a) (" [T] his generation is a trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations ... ."); ALASKA CONST. pmbl. ("We the people of Alaska, grateful to God and to those who founded our nation and pioneered
this great land, in order to secure and transmit to succeeding generations our heritage of political, civil, and religious liberty within the Union of States, do ordain and
establish this constitution for the State of Alaska."); ILL. CONST. pmbl. ("We, the people of the State of Illinois, grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political, and religious liberty which He hath so long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to Him for a
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generations,"' 167 or "this and future generations." 168 Indexicals like
"this generation" or "succeeding" or "future" as applied to generations make no sense spoken by an intergenerational author. 169
Further, Article VII makes clear that the ratifying conventions at
the time of the Founding are the ones who "establish" the Constitution: "The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying the Same.' 170 The Preamble, moreover, identifies "We the
People" as the ones who do the same thing-who "ordain and establish
this Constitution."171 According to the Preamble and Article VII, then,
"We the People" are a collection of ratifying conventions. Article VII
says that what the ratifying conventions do is "sufficient" for doing
what the Preamble says that "We the People" do. Without convenblessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmit the same unimpaired to succeeding generations .... "); NJ. CONST. pmbl. ("We, the people of the State of New
Jersey, grateful to Almighty God for the civil and religious liberty which He hath so
long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to
secure and transmit the same, unimpaired, to succeeding generations .... "); R.I.
CONST. pmbl. ("We, the people of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, grateful to Almighty God for the civil and religious liberty which He hath so
long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to
secure and to transmit the same unimpaired to succeeding generations .... ").
167 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 543, § 1 (stating purpose "to protect the natural
heritage of Alabama for the benefit of present and future generations"); HAW. CONST.
art. XI, § 1 ("For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its
political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources .... "); ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("The public policy of the State and the
duty of each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future generations."); MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1) ("The state and
each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations.").
168 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 543, § 2 (20) (b) (articulating the purpose "to protect the natural heritage and diversity of Alabama for future generations"); CoLo.
CONST. art. IX, § 10(1) (c) ("[T]he economic productivity of all lands held in public
trust is dependent on sound stewardship, including protecting and enhancing the
beauty, natural values, open space and wildlife habitat thereof, for this and future
generations."); MONT. CONST. pmbl. (articulating the purpose "to secure the blessings
of liberty for this and future generations").
169 I should note one bit of contrary evidence here. A 1971 amendment to Pennsylvania's Constitution added a provision that makes clear that "the people" includes
later generations. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1971) ("Pennsylvania's public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, includinggenerationsyet to come."
(emphasis added)). It is not clear that "the people" here is the same as Pennsylvania's
preambulatory "We, the people," but this is one bit of evidence at least suggesting an
intergenerational people.
170

U.S. CONST. art. VII (emphasis added).

171

Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
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tions, there can be no "contemporary ratification" of the sort
described in Article VII. I 72 No additional later participation by later

generations of "We the People" is required, according to Article VII
and the Preamble, to establish "this Constitution" (and, obviously, to
attach meaning to it). The relevant constituting thus happened at the
Founding, not later.
A number of state constitutions make it fully explicit, usually in
their preambles, that the constitutional author is the convention
assembled at the time of the Founding. 173 In lieu of evidence that the
172 Contemporary ratification might serve some other purpose, of course-the
Article VI oath is close to contemporary ratification-but it would not be literal Article VII contemporary ratification that would make people today the constitutional
author.
173 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. sched., § 6 ("Done by the people of Alabama, through
their delegates in convention assembled in the hall of the House of Representatives,
at Montgomery, Alabama, this the third day of September, Anno Domini, nineteen
hundred and one."); ALA. CONST. of 1861, pmbl. ("We the People of the State of
Alabama... being now by our representatives in Convention assembled .... "); ALA.
CONST. of 1819, pmbl. ("We, the people of the Alabama Territory... assembled in
convention at the town of Huntsville, on Monday, the fifth day of July, one thousand
eight hundred and nineteen .... "); ARK. CONST. of 1836, pmbl. ("We, the people of
the Territory of Arkansas, by our representatives in convention assembled, at Little
); FLA. CONST. of 1865,
Rock, on Monday, the 4th day of January, A.D. 1836 ....
pmbl. ("We, the people of the State of Florida, by our delegates in convention assembled, in the city of Tallahassee, on the 25th day of October, in the year of our Lord
1865 ... ."); FLA. CONST. of 1838, pmbl. ("We, the People of the Territory of Florida,
by our delegates in convention, assembled at the city of SaintJoseph, on Monday, the
3d day of December, A.D. 1838...."); ILL. CONST. of 1818, pmbl. ("The people of the
Illinois Territory ... do, by their representatives in convention .... "); IND. CONST. of
1816, pmbl. ("We the Representatives of the people of the Territory of Indiana, in
Convention met, at Corydon, on Monday the tenth day of June in the year of our
Lord eighteen hundred and sixteen .... "); Ky. CONST. ordinance ("We, the representatives of the people of Kentucky, in Convention assembled .... "); Ky. CONST. of
1792, pmbl. ("We, the representatives of the people of the State of Kentucky, in convention assembled .... "); LA. CONST. of 1861, pmbl. ("We, the People of the State of
Louisiana, in Convention assembled .... "); LA. CoNsT. of 1812, pmbl. ("We, the
Representatives of the People of all that part of the Territory or country ceded under
); MD. CONST. of 1776,
the name of Louisiana . . . in Convention Assembled ....
Declaration of Rights, para. XLII ("This Declaration of Rights was assented to, and
passed, in Convention of the Delegates of the freemen of Maryland, begun and held
at Annapolis, the 14th day of August, A.D. 1776."); MICH. CONST. of 1835, pmbl. ("In
convention, begun at the city of Detroit, on the second Monday of May, in the year
one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five: We, the people of the Territory of Michi); Miss. CONST. pmbl. ("We the people of Mississippi, in Convention assemgan .
bled .... "); Miss. CONST. of 1817, pmbl. ("We, the representatives of the people,
inhabiting the western part of the Mississippi territory... assembled in convention, at
the town of Washington, on Monday, the seventh day July, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen . . . ."); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, pmbl. ("IN CONVENTION OF THE
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nature of these states' constitutions is different from the nature of the
Federal Constitution or of other states, we should conclude that the
author of the Federal Constitution is likewise temporally confined to
the time of the Founding. If a constitution that begins "We the People in convention assembled at [a particular place] on [a particular
date]" has the same sort of nature as a constitution that begins simply
"We the People," we should conclude that "We the People" means
"We the People at the time of the Founding," especially when Article
VII implies the same thing.
2.

"Now" and the Historically Confined Constitution

A limit to the twenty-year protection of the slave trade in Article I,
Section 9 makes explicit reference to the time at which the Constitution speaks:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred
and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation,
not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. 174
The point of the "now existing" limitation was to allow Congress
to prohibit the slave trade to new states even before 1808.175 If a citizen of 1795 were to say "states now existing," he would include Kentucky, but a citizen of 1787 would not. Because the provision plainly
applies to original slave states, but not to Kentucky, it is obvious that
"now" refers to the Founding.
On a reading on which the Constitution is spoken today, or is
enacted intergenerationally, the "now existing" language is nonsense.
If we are continuously reenacting the words of the Constitution, and
thereby expressing their contemporary meaning, then when we do so
with the word "now," we refer to today, not the Founding. But if I am
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Kingston, 20th April, 1777. ... "); id. art.
I ("This convention, therefore in the name and by the authority of the good people of
this State .. . ."); id. art. II ("This convention doth further, in the name and by the
authority of the good people of this State ... ."); S.C. CONST. pmbl. ("We, the people
of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled .... ); S.C. CONST. of 1868,
pmbl. ("We, the People of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled.. . ."); S.C. CONST. of 1865, pmbl. ("We, the people of the State of South Carolina, by our delegates in convention met ....").
174 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
175 See AMAR,AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 274-75 ("[A] reference in
the 1808 clause to 'the States now existing' . . . implicitly allowed Congress to ban

transatlantic slave imports into new states even before 1808
CONST.

art. I, § 9, cl. 1)).

....

"

(quoting U.S.
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speaking an indexical like "now" at the same time that I am applying
it, a "now existing" state is simply any state at all. Making sense of a
document with "now" in it therefore requires distinguishing between
the time of application and the time of authorship. 176 An intergenerationally authored, or continuously reauthored, Constitution would
not sensibly use the term "now" to refer to the initial composition of
the text. In using such a temporal indexical, the Constitution thus
makes clear that it is historically confined to the Founding.
A review of state constitutions reveals a great many instances of
177
the term "now" to refer to the time of their respective foundings.
176 The Supreme Court similarly interpreted "now" in Carcieriv. Salazar, No. 07526, slip. op. at 8-10 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2009) (stating that "now" in 1934 statute refers to
1934).
177 I have greatly abbreviated this list to include only the cases where "now" contributes in a significant way to the operation of a provision. See, e.g., AlA. CONST. art.
VI, § 167 (stating that restrictions on prosecutors "shall not operate to abridge the
term of any Solicitor now in office"); ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. XI, § 8 (stating that
constitutional reduction in salaries "shall not apply to any of said officers now in
office"); ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 29 ("[T]he General Assembly shall make no
appropriations previous to the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-five, for
the building of any other State House than that now provided for by law."); CONN.
CONST. of 1818, art. X, § 3 ("All judicial and civil officers now in office .. .shall
continue to hold their offices until the first day of June next ....");DEL. CONSr.
sched., § 9 ("All the courts of justice now existing shall continue with their present
jurisdiction, and the Chancellor and judges shall continue in office until the tenth
day of June in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven .... ); DEL.
CONST. of 1831, sched., § 5 ("All the courts ofjustice now existing shall continue with
their present jurisdiction, and the chancellor and judges and the clerks of the said
courts shall continue in office until the said third Tuesday of January, in the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two ....); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art.
VIII, § 10 ("[A]II actions and prosecutions now pending shall proceed as if this constitution had not been made."); FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. V, § 26, cl. 13 (1956) ("The
provision for automatic retirement in Section 17 of this Article does not apply to any
person now holding office."); FLA. CONST. of 1868, ordinances, no. 2 ("[A]II persons
");
now in confinement for the nonpayment of Taxes, shall be forthwith released ....
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. XII, § 7 ("All suits, pleas, plaints and other proceedings now
depending in any Court of Record orJustice's Court shall be prosecuted to final judgment and execution . . .in the same manner as is now provided by law, and all proceedings had therein in as full and complete a manner as if this Constitution were not
adopted."); LA. CONST. of 1868, amend. XI (1878) ("For each district there shall be
one district court, except in the parish of Orleans, in which the General Assembly
may establish as many district courts as the public interest may require, not to exceed
the number now authorized by existing laws, except by a two-thirds vote of all the
members elected to both branches of the General Assembly."); ME. CONST. amend.
XXIX (stating that literacy voting requirement "shall not apply ...to any person who
now has the right to vote"); MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("The system of Public Schools,
as now constituted, shall remain in force until the end of the said first session of the
General Assembly, and shall then expire, except so far as adopted or continued by the
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In each of these instances, interpreting the state constitution as spoken intergenerationally or at the time of interpretation would plainly
misinterpret, or make nonsense of, the provision.
The preamble to the South Carolina Constitution of 1778
includes "now" and "following" in describing the Constitution: "Be it
therefore constituted and enacted ... That the following articles, agreed
upon by the freemen of this State, now met in general assembly, be
deemed and held the constitution and form of government of the said
State

....

"178

It is clear from this statement both that the Constitution

is the text-that is, the language which is "following"-and that the
Constitution speaks at the time of the Founding-that is, the time
referred to by "now."
General Assembly."); MicH. CONST. of 1835, art. XII, § 7 ("No county now organized
by law shall ever be reduced, by the organization of new counties, to less than four
hundred square miles."); N.H. CONST. art. XI (1903) (stating that the literacy voting
requirement "shall not apply... to any person who now has the right to vote"); N.J.
CONST. art. I, § 8 ("No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on
the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases of impeachment, or in
cases now prosecuted without indictment .. "); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. VI, § VI, cl.
1 ("There shall be no more than five judges of the inferior court of common pleas in
each of the counties in this State, after the terms of the judges of said court now in
office shall terminate."); N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. VI, § 12 (1909) (amended 1925)
("Those justices elected in the first and second judicial departments shall continue to
receive from their respective cities, counties or districts, as now provided by law, such
additional compensation as will make their aggregate compensation what they are
now receiving."); N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. I, § 16 (" [T] he governor, lieutenant-governor, senators and members of assembly, now in office, shall continue to hold the
same until the first day ofJanuary, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-three, and
no longer."); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, pmbl. (referring to resolution of "thirty-first day of
May, now last past"); id. art. VII (providing for exemption to voting rules for "every
person who now is a freeman of the city of Albany"); OKLA. CONST. art. XXII, § 1
(imposing a ban on alien land ownership that "shall not apply to lands now owned by
aliens in this State"); PA. CONST. of 1873, art. IX, § 8 (regarding seven-percent-of-realestate-valuation limitation on municipal debt, providing for exception for "any city,
the debt of which now exceeds seven per centum of such assessed valuation"); id.
sched., § 17 ("Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be held to reduce the
compensation now paid to any law judge of this Commonwealth now in commission."); PA. CONs-r. of 1790, sched., § 8 (providing for meeting of judges of elections
"at the house now occupied by David Miller" and "at the house now occupied byJohn
Dickey"); R.I. CONST. of 1843, art. X, § 2 ("Chancery powers may be conferred on the
supreme court, but on no other court to any greater extent than is now provided by
law."); WASH. CONsT. art. VI, § 1 (1910) (amended 1974) (stating that literacy voting
requirements "shall not affect the fights of franchise of any person who is now a qualified elector of this state"); W. VA. CONST. art. X, § I (establishing exception for property tax limit "to pay the principal and interest of bonded indebtedness of the State
now existing").
178 S.C. CONST. of 1778, pmbl. (second and third emphases added).
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"The Time of the Adoption of This Constitution"

Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 provides: "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President .... ,,179 "The time of the Adoption of this Constitution" is obviously the time of the Founding. State constitutions likewise refer
frequently to a particular time at which they are adopted.' 8 0
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, ct. 5.
See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. VI, § 20 (requiring compilation of laws
"[w]ithin five years after the adoption of this Constitution"); ALASKA CONST. art. VIII,
179
180

§ 11 (referring to "the date of ratification of this constitution by the people of
Alaska"); id. art. XII, § 1 (referring to "the date of ratification of this constitution by
the people of Alaska"); id. art. XV, § 1 (referring to "laws in force in the Territory of
Alaska on the effective date of this constitution"); DEL. CONST. sched., § 18 (referring
to "the time this Constitution shall take effect"); HAW. CONST. sched., § 2 (referring to
"the time this constitution takes effect"); ILL. CONST. of 1870, sched., § 17 (referring
to the time "[w]hen this constitution shall be ratified by the people"); id. sched., § 23
(referring to the time "[w]hen this constitution shall be adopted and take effect as
the supreme law of the State of Illinois"); IND. CONST. sched., § 9 (amended 1984)
(referring to the time "when this Constitution shall go into effect"); Ky. CONST. ordinance ("We, the representatives of the people of Kentucky ... do ordain and proclaim the foregoing to be the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky from
and after this date."); LA. CONST. of 1812, art. IV, §11 (referring to the time "when
this constitution goes into effect"); MD. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights ("This
Declaration of Rights was assented to, and passed, in Convention of the Delegates of
the freemen of Maryland, begun and held at Annapolis, the 14th day of August, A.D.
1776."); id. conclusion ("This Form of Government was Assented to, and passed in
Convention of the Delegates of the freemen of Maryland, begun and held at the city
of Annapolis, the fourteenth of August, A. D. one thousand seven hundred and seventy-six."); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 26 (referring to "the time this constitution
becomes effective"); Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 159 (referring to the time "when this constitution is put in operation"); MONT. CONST. transition sched., § 4 (referring to the
time "when this Constitution becomes effective"); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II, art. XIII
(referring to "seven years from the time this constitution shall take effect"); NJ.
CONST. art. XI, § 1, cl. 3 (referring to "the time this Constitution or any Article
thereof takes effect"); N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (amended 1911 and 1996) (referring
to "two years from the time this constitution goes into effect"); N.Y. CONST. of 1846,
art. XIV, § 2 (referring to the time "when this Constitution shall take effect"); N.C.
CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 25 (amended 1952 and 1954) (referring to the time "when
this constitution shall go into effect"); N.D. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (referring to "the time
this constitution takes effect"); OKLA. CONST. sched., § 23 (referring to "[wihen this
Constitution shall go into effect"); PA. CONST. of 1874, art. V, § 5 (referring to the
time "when this Constitution shall be adopted"); S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. XIV, § 9
(referring to the time "when this Constitution goes into effect"); TEX. CONST. art.

XVI, § 53 (repealed 1994) (referring to the time "when this constitution is adopted");
W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 4 (referring to "the time this constitution goes into
operation").
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An intergenerationally adopted constitution could not use "the
time of the adoption of this Constitution" as a particular time, as the
Constitution does. If the Meiklejohn/Breyer theory is right, and the
Constitution is really something "We the People" adopt today, then
Arnold Schwarzenegger can actually be President, because he is a citizen today, at the time today's Constitution is adopted. If Rubenfeld's
theory of the transgenerationally adopted Constitution were right,
then it would make no sense to speak of a particular time at which a
Constitution is adopted.
"This Constitution" is, then, located at the time of the Founding.
The constituting of the United States happened at the Founding. It
did not happen over generations and does not happen anew every
day. The constitutional author distinguished itself from succeeding
generations, identified its work of establishing the Constitution with
the Founding's ratifying conventions, and spoke of the Founding as
the time of its adoption. If we ask the Constitution what time it isthat is, what it means by the term "now"-it answers with the time of
the Founding.
E.

What About Amendments?

Article VI's "this Constitution" refers, of course, to the original
Constitution, and presents its nature. There is, however, good reason
to think that the amendments are the same sort of entity as the original Constitution presented in Article VI. Article V says that amendments become "valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution."'' If that is right, then it is hard to see how an amendment could be a fundamentally different sort of entity from the original Constitution. If the original Constitution is composed of
language, it is hard to see how a later amendment's purpose or the
expected applications of a later amendment could become "part" of
it. Just as Article VII specifies the time of the ratifying conventions as
the time at which the Constitution is "established,"'182 Article V says
1 83
that amendments are "valid ... when ratified."
The Fourteenth Amendment contains three suggestions that it
presents itself in the same manner that Article VI presents the original
Constitution. The resolution proposing the amendment stated that
"the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the several
18 4
States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
181
182
183
184

U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
Id. art. VII.
Id. art. V (emphasis added).
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (emphasis added).
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Because ultimate purposes and expected applications are not "following," only a text, this description supports textualism much as the
original Constitution's cover letter does. Section 3 of the amendment
disqualifies from office those who rebelled against the United States
after taking an oath to support the Constitution-an emphatic
enforcement of Article VI itself.18 5 Section 5 says that Congress has
power to "enforce . . . the provisions of this article.' 8 6 "This article"
seems to be self-referential in the same way as Article VI's "this Constitution," and Congress is to "enforce" it-characteristic of a command,
rather than the sort of assessment to be revised in the manner of the
common law.
Other uses of "this" in amendments suggest a constitutional
ontology similar to that of Article VI. The Seventeenth Amendment
says: "This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election
or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the
Constitution."1 8 7 The amendment thus situates its validity at a particular point in time-just as "the time of the adoption of this Constitution" does for the original Constitution-and fits with Article V's
language of amendments as parts of a single entity. As noted above,
the Eighteenth Amendment equates what is done "hereby" with what
is done by "this article."18 8 It also says that "[t] his articleshall be inoperative" unless it is ratified "within seven years from the date of the
submission hereof to the States by the Congress. 1 89 Again, "this article" situates itself at a particular point in time-the time of ratification. The Twentieth and Twenty-Second Amendments likewise put
"this article" at the time of ratification, 190 and the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments refer to the enforcement of "this article,"'191 again suggesting the same sort of constitutional ontology as
Article VI's "this Constitution."
185 See U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 3 ("No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President or Vice President... who, having previously
taken an oath ...to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same .
186 Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
187 Id. amend. XVII, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
188 See supra text accompanying note 143.
189 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 3 (repealed 1933) (emphasis added).
190 See id. amend. XX, § 6 ("This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have
been ratified . . .within seven years from the date of its submission."); id. amend.
XXII, § 2 (same).
191 Id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XVIII, § 2; id. amend.
XIX, cl.2; id. amend. XXIII, § 2; id. amend. XXIV, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, § 2.
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OBJECTIONS

Article VI As Tautological

Stephen Durden has criticized Kesavan and Paulsen's attempt to
ground originalism in Article VI by relying on Alexander Hamilton's
gloss on the Supremacy Clause in FederalistNo. 33.192 Durden argues
that because the Constitution would be authoritative and supreme
even without the Supremacy Clause, the Supremacy Clause cannot
embed a theory of the Constitution's own nature and what should be
supreme in constitutional interpretation.
However, even if Article VI restates a principle that is in some
sense implicit in the very idea of a federal constitution-it would
make little sense, for instance, to have a federal constitution but allow
states to nullify it when they chose-Article VI does make that principle explicit. Further, it does so in a very specific way with the demonstrative phrase "this Constitution." Without such a clause, structural
arguments like those in Federalist No. 33 would still be available to
show the supremacy of federal law. If Durden's interpretation of
Hamilton's argument in FederalistNo. 33 is right that structural arguments could literally replicate the rule of Article VI, then such structural arguments would ultimately support textualist semi-originalism
just as the arguments above do.1 9 3 But Article VI means that we need
192 See Stephen M. Durden, Plain Language Textualism: Some PersonalPredilections
Are More Equal than Others, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 337, 363 (2008); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he constitutional operation of the intended government would be precisely the same if these
clauses were entirely obliterated as if they were repeated in every article. They are
only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable
implication from the very act of constituting a federal government and vesting it with
certain specified powers."); id. at 204 ("A LAW, by the very meaning of the term,
includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to
observe. This results from every political association. If individuals enter into a state
of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If
a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which the
latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies and the individuals of whom they are
composed.").
193 It is not obvious, however, that Hamilton claimed that all of Article VI is redundant. Rather, it appears Hamilton argued only the first clause-making "this Constitution" supreme over state law-was redundant. Hamilton's argument for
redundancy never mentioned the oath provision, but rather revolved around the
inherent nature of law as bestowing a government with specified powers. See THE
FEDERALIsT No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 192, at 202-04. Certainly it has
played an important role in fostering the actual contemporary culture of oath taking,
if nothing else.
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not go that route: our job in discerning the Constitution's theory of
itself is confined to an analysis of the meaning of "this Constitution" in
that Article. Indeed, even if something a bit different would emerge
as supreme from the sort of structural arguments that we could
employ if Article VI were omitted, Article VI is in the Constitution,
and its assertion of what is supreme obviously trumps whatever would
emerge from structural inference based on a constitution lacking Article VI.
Durden claims that the Kesavan-Paulsen argument "relies on the
assumption that the Constitution is binding only because the
Supremacy Clause says so."194 However, there is no need to make
such an assumption simply to view Article VI as establishing the Constitution's presentation of itself. There might be all sorts of other reasons to think that the Constitution is binding. The argument I
present here only requires that one of them-and one embodied in
officeholders' oaths today-is Article VI.
B.

Circularity

By far the most frequent objection to constitutional self-definition is the claim that it would be viciously circular. Paul Brest, Frederick Schauer, Larry Tribe, Richard Fallon, David Strauss, and many
others have argued that it is conceptually impossible for a Constitution to prescribe binding rules for its own interpretation or to specify
its own nature. Because a constitution always depends on acceptance
by the governing authorities to become law, the argument goes, its
own ipse dixit is not enough. But if a constitution's own ipse dixit is not
enough, then we should merely consult present norms of acceptance
to discover the Constitution's nature. If present norms of acceptance
allow court decisions, for instance, to count as "the Constitution,"
then it doesn't matter what Article VI says.
There are numerous examples of this argument. Paul Brest, for
instance, says,
[A]lthough article VI declares that the Constitution is the "supreme
law of the land," a document cannot achieve the status of law, let
alone supreme law, merely by its own assertion.
...
[I] t is only through a history of continuing assent or acquiescence that the document could become law. Our constitutional
tradition, however, has not focused on the document alone, but on

194

Durden, supra note 192, at 367.
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the decisions and practices of courts and other institutions. And
195
this tradition has included major elements of nonoriginalism.
In his work on the nature of the Constitution, Sanford Levinson
states: "[R] ecourse to 'the Constitution' as a source of guidance within
our own polity simply begs the question of what counts as 'the Constitution' . . . . [A]ll suggested answers inevitably are circular. There is
simply no way of referring to 'the Constitution' for a criterion of what
'the Constitution' is."' 196 Similarly, Laurence Tribe says this in
response to Justice Scalia's theory of the Constitution: "There is certainly nothing in the text itself that proclaims the Constitution's text
to be the sole or ultimate point of reference-and, even if there were,
such a self-referential proclamation would raise the problem of infinite regress .... ,,197 After arguing that giving meaning to "this Constitution" requires looking outside the "four corners of the document,"
Frederick Schauer states:
Yet, it would be misleading even to suggest that something in
the Constitution could tell us to what 'this Constitution' refers. I
now want to suggest that this is impossible. Suppose I were to draft a
document entitled "The Constitution of the United States," granting all of the powers of governance over the territory known as "The
United States of America" to me and thirty of my closest friends.
And suppose I were to include within this document a provision
specifying the condition for effectiveness (an analog to Article VII),
to be the signing of this document by me and sixteen of the thirty
named individuals. And suppose finally that sixteen of the named
individuals and I did in fact sign the document in full compliance
with its specified condition for its own effectiveness.
Were all of this to take place, then there would exist in the
United States two (or possibly more) documents, each purporting
to be "The Constitution of the United States," and each fully effec195 Brest, supra note 3, at 225 (footnote omitted).
196 LEVINSON, supra note 5, at 36.
197 Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 79,
at 77-78. The material canvassed above, of course, is my response to the first part of
Tribe's comment, see supra Part II. He makes a similar argument again in LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 6 (2008) ("[N]othing in the visible text can tell
us that what we are reading really is the Constitution, rather than an incomplete or
otherwise inaccurate facsimile, or even a complete hoax. And even if we accept the
copy in this book as accurate and complete, it cannot tell us-authoritatively, anyway-that it truly is the legitimate, binding, fundamental law of the United States,
trumping all other sources of law. Oh, it says it's the 'supreme Law of the Land,' all
right-right there in its own Article VI-but the fact that a text proclaims its own
supremacy, while displaying confidence on the part of its authors and ratifiers, can't
in itself establish that text as legitimate, much less as 'supreme.'").
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tive according to its own internally specified conditions for effectiveness. But it is equally clear that only one of these "Constitutions"
would be the Constitution of the United States, because only one of
these documents would have been accepted, socially and politically,
by the people of the United States as their Constitution.1 9 8

Many other theorists have echoed Schauer's argument that present acceptance, not the Constitution's assertion, is dispositive of the
nature of "the Constitution."'19 9
I agree with part of the thrust of Schauer's argument. Present
acceptance is a necessary condition for Article VI's claim about "this
Constitution" to be successful. However, we should not confuse the
necessary conditions for a claim to be successful with the full assessment of a claim itself. The fact that a car requires gasoline to run, and
not just an engine, does not mean that we can understand a car by
simply worrying about the proper gasoline, neglecting the design and
function of the engine. Likewise, the fact that Article VI's claim to
make "this Constitution" supreme must be accepted in order for it to
be effective does not obviate the need to investigate what, exactly, that
claim amounts to.
Consider four examples of instances in which an entity's own testimony is critical for assessing its nature. All of them show why we can
198

Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of ConstitutionalNorms,

17 HAR. J.L. &

PUB. POL'Y

45, 51-52 (1994); see also Frederick Schauer, Amending the

Presuppositionsof a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 145, 152-53 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995) (making the same argument).
199 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, DefendingJudicialSupremacy: A
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 465 (2000); Randy E. Barnett, ConstitutionalLegitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 111, 125-27 (2003); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional
Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of HartianPositivistJurisprudence,86 N.C. L. REv. 1107,
1128-29 & n.78 (2008); Fallon, supra note 102, at 545-46; Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
JudicialLegitimacy and the Unwritten Constitution:A Comment on Miranda and Dickerson,
45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 119, 133-35 (2000); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the
Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 570, 585-88
(2001); R. Stephen Painter, Jr., Reserving the Right: Does a ConstitutionalMarriageAmendment Necessarily Trump an Earlierand More GeneralEqual Protection or Privacy Provision?
36 SETON HALL L. REv. 125, 159 (2005); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and
ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 606, 643 (2008); David A. Strauss,
What Is Constitutional Theory?, 87 CAL. L. REv. 581, 583 & n.9 (1999); Laurence H.
Tribe, Taking Text and StructureSeriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in Constitutional
Interpretation,108 HARv. L. REV. 1221, 1290-91 & n.225 (1995); Ernest A. Young, The
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 421 (2007). One anonymous
commenter lodged the circularity objection to a preview of this article's argument
contained in an earlier article. See Posting of William to Books Do Furnish a Room,
http://booksdofumisharoom.blogspot.com/2007/07/philosophy-of-language-andoriginalism.html (July 19, 2007, 1:59 EST) (considering Green, supra note 22).
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neither simply accept self-testimony as uncontroversially true, nor dismiss it as irrelevant.
First, consider persons who tell us who they are and what they do.
A constitution claiming to be the supreme law of the land is no more
viciously circular than a person claiming to be a janitor. It is true that
non-janitors can claim to be janitors, and non-constitutions can claim
to be the Constitution. But if someone tells me, "I'm a janitor," then
he either is a janitor or has a job that does not require perfect honesty. Those who make false claims about theirjobs are not, in general,
to be taken seriously.2 00 Taking the Constitution seriously, to the
point of swearing an oath to support and defend it, yet rejecting the
specific claims to supremacy embodied in the meaning of "this Constitution," is incoherent. Anyone who claims to have sworn an Article VI
oath, yet simultaneously claims to lack any obligation to follow Article
VI's definition of "this Constitution," contradicts himself.
Second, consider Federal Rule of Evidence 902.201 That rule recognizes that frequently we must rely on what documents say about
themselves to assess their nature. "Extrinsic evidence of authenticity"
is not required for twelve categories of document, including "[a] document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States,' 20 2 or
"publications purporting to be issued by public authority. ' 20 3 McCormick explains the traditional rule embodied in Rule 902: "There are
certain kinds of writing which are said to 'prove themselves' or to be
'self-identifying.' In consequence one of these may be tendered to
the court and, even without the shepherding angel of an authenticat20 4
ing witness, will be accepted in evidence for what it purports to be."
200 Compare C.S. Lewis' comments on Jesus' claim to be God:
A man who was merely a man and said the sort of things Jesus said
would not be a great moral teacher. He would either be a lunatic-on a
level with the man who says he is a poached egg-or else he would be the
Devil of Hell. You must make your choice. Either this man was, and is, the
Son of God; or else a madman or something worse. You can shut Him up
for a fool, you can spit at Him and kill Him as a demon; or you can fall at His
feet and call Him Lord and God. But let us not come with any patronising
nonsense about His being a great human teacher. He has not left that open
to us. He did not intend to.
C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 54 (1952). It likewise makes little sense to accept the
Constitution as somehow extremely important to our law, but reject its claim to make
"this Constitution" supreme. Article VI does not leave that open to us.
201 FED. R. EVID. 902.
202 Id. 902(1).
203 Id. 902(5).
204 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 186, at 397
(1954).
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In short, the acceptance of documentary self-testimony is plainly not
seen as perniciously circular when ordinary decisions are made about
the admissibility of evidence. There is no reason to set a higher standard of finding a foundation for the identity of the Constitution.
Third, consider the parol evidence rule, which allows contracts to
define the extent of the agreement between the parties through an
integration clause. 20 5 Just after presenting his circularity argument,
Tribe notes the apparent counterexample of the parol evidence rule.
"Reading . . .integration clauses as decisive avoids the self-reference

puzzle only because the authoritative nature of these clauses is
thought to follow not from the contracts in which they appear but
from the background contract law governing those documents. 2 °6
True enough, an integration clause needs a court to enforce it in
order to be effective. Article VI likewise needs people today to decide
to actually agree to swear the oath it requires. But once we have a
practice of enforcing integration clauses, we look to individual contracts to see if they have such clauses, and if so, exactly how those
clauses are written. Likewise, once we have a practice of swearing the
Article VI oath, officeholders who are part of that practice should consider themselves bound by the actual nature of the "this Constitution"
such an oath makes supreme.
Fourth, the example of coups and self-crowning kings makes
.plain that we can make sense of self-authenticating assertions of
authority. Schauer's example of his friends asserting an entitlement
to govern the United States 20 7 is, of course, not seriously meant. If it
were, it would be an attempt at a coup d'6tat. A Napoleanically selfcrowning king is not incoherent. Those subject to such assertions of
authority, seriously meant, must attend to their exact nature in order
to decide how to oppose or work with them. It would be foolish to
deal with a coup attempt by saying that the success of any assertion of
authority depends on its acceptance, so we need not concern ourselves with what authority, exactly, the plotters are asserting. Likewise,
we cannot say that the details of the Constitution's assertions about
itself do not matter, merely because they must be accepted in order to
be effective.

205 SeeJOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO
130-40 (5th ed. 2003).
206 Tribe, supra note 197, at 78 n.24.
207 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The Federal Constitution embodies, I have claimed, a theory of
its own nature. Examining other uses of "this Constitution" and other
indexical language elsewhere in the Federal Constitution and in state
constitutions can help us see that the Constitution presents itself as a
historically situated text-that is, a text whose meaning was attached
to it at the time of the Founding. Those who swear the Article VI oath
should therefore be textualist semi-originalists who take the historic
textually expressed sense as interpretively paramount.

